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1. Motivation 
When American investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in 
September 2009, common perceptions about the financial sector had to be 
revaluated. “Too big to fail”, a concept taken to be irrevocable for decades, had 
suddenly become outdated. The following worldwide financial crisis affected 
not only banks but whole economies and led to fundamental questioning of 
banks’ business practices and their impact on global economies. Many 
countries were forced to bail out credit institutions and bear the burden of crisis 
related costs. At the same time tax revenues declined due to shrinking 
economies.
1
 As a result many countries discussed how to influence banks’ 
business practices and refinance crisis related costs. Governments’ options can 
be grouped into either regulatory or tax measures. Keen (2011) provides a 
theoretical analysis of the interaction between regulation and taxation building 
on a seminal study by Weitzman (1974). Whereas in theory tax and regulation 
policies may be considered as perfect substitutes, practical considerations 
suggest that both policy instruments should be used.   
As for regulatory measures, various single country restrictions were imposed. 
In addition the Basel III package (BCBS 2010) increased both liquidity and 
capital requirements for its adopters. However, implementing efficient tax 
measures is not as straight forward and bears the risk of undesired distortions. 
Promoted by the IMF, bank levies of a Pigouvian rationale have been adopted 
in a number of countries, in varying forms. First evidence on banks’ response, 
however, is mixed (Devereux et al. 2013). 
                                                          
1
 Germany reported a decrease of tax revenue by 6,6% in 2009. 
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Another measure seriously considered in the European Union is a financial 
transaction tax. However, its effect is still controversial. Supporters claim 
taxing transactions between banks will lead to less short-term speculative 
trading and more value-oriented investments. In contrast, opponents state that it 
will disrupt market efficiency and as differentiation is impossible the would not 
only be levied on “harmful” transactions but also on “normal” transactions. In 
addition it should be noted that the tax will only affect banks’ behavior if a 
worldwide concept prevents them from using loopholes, such as relocation of 
business. As a result the proposal was not yet implemented.
2
  
Nevertheless, apart from new taxes yet to be installed, the current tax system 
should give some insight on the status quo of banks’ tax response and could 
help policy makers design the most efficient tax instruments. Current empirical 
evidence on financial institutions’ tax response is scarce (Huizinga et al. 2014; 
de Mooij and Keen 2012). However, it suggests banks being similarly 
aggressive to non-financial firms, which have been at the heart of the recent 
debate on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD 2013). Hence, publicly 
available information on banks’ multinational structure, profit reporting and 
location choices enable researchers to evaluate empirically how these choices 
are influenced by taxation. 
This thesis consists of three essays examining banks’ tax response. The first 
essay Tax vs. Regulation Policy and the Location of Financial Sector FDI is 
co-authored with Prof. Dr. Michael Overesch, Chair of Business Taxation at 
the University of Cologne and Prof. Dr. Georg Wamser, Chair of Public 
Finance at the University of Tuebingen. It aims to investigate how taxation and 
                                                          
2
 As for the EU, following an agreement of the Finance Ministers a proposal was set out in 
February 2013. However, a final agreement has been postponed. 
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regulatory constraints influence German banks’ decision to locate branches or 
subsidiaries in specific countries.   
In the second essay Profit Shifting and Tax Response of Multinational Banks, 
co-authored with Prof. Dr. Michael Overesch, Chair of Business Taxation at 
the University of Cologne, we evaluate if banks engage in profit shifting and 
estimate the extent. In additional analysis we test different profit components 
for their tax elasticity. Finally, we test often suspected shifting channels, such 
as leverage and loan loss provisions, to support our results. The paper is 
currently in the second round of revision at the Journal of Banking and 
Finance. The paper was presented at the 3
rd
 EIASM Workshop on Current 
Research in Taxation 2013, the 37th European Accounting Association Annual 
Congress 2014, the 76. Jahrestagung des Verbands der Hochschullehrer für 
Betriebswirtschaft (VHB) 2014, the IIPF Doctoral School 2014 in Oxford and 
the Annual MaTax Conference 2014.   
The thesis concludes with an essay on recapitalized banks. Tax Aggressiveness 
vs. Capital Injections - Can Banks Have It All?  is based on a working paper 
with MSc. Tanja Herbert, doctoral research assistant at the chair of business 
taxation at the University of Cologne. Using a hand-collected data set we 
analyze the change in tax aggressiveness of banks caused by capital injections 
during the financial crisis. We thereby measure the effect government 
influence had on banks’ tax aggressiveness. The paper was presented at the 
PhD Seminar on Taxation 2015 at the Freie Universität Berlin. 
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2. Tax vs. Regulation Policy and the Location of Financial Sector FDI 
2.1 Research question and design 
The essay Tax vs. Regulation Policy and the Location of Financial Sector FDI 
analyzes how corporate taxation and regulatory requirements affect the 
location of financial sector FDI. Previous literature has provided vast evidence 
of host country determinants for financial sector FDI. Namely, distance 
(Focarelli and Pozzolo 2005; Buch and Lipponer 2007; Claessens and van 
Horen 2014), bilateral trade (Brealey and Kaplanis 1996; Yamori 1998; Buch 
2000; Berger et al. 2004; Focarelli and Pozzolo 2001, 2005) and host country 
characteristics such as market size and GDP per capita (Yamori 1998; Buch 
2000; Claessens et al. 2001; Cerruti et al. 2007) were identified as drivers. 
Moreover, since the financial sector is a particularly regulated industry, a high 
level of regulation is seen as an additional cost and therefore associated with a 
negative effect on foreign activity (Buch 2003; Buch and Lipponer 2007; Tsai 
et al. 2011).  
A consequence of firms’ multinational structure is the increased opportunity to 
allocate profits in favorable destinations. Firms without international activities 
are rather limited in their opportunities to optimize their tax burden. Therefore, 
taxation should be considered as an additional incentive when analyzing FDI. 
While for some destinations the incentive might be clearly tax driven, others 
like Ireland or Luxembourg offer a mixed spectrum of incentives for banks. 
Hence, to distinguish between both incentives should give valuable insights on 
what attracts banking FDI.  
We conduct estimates on own- and cross-elasticities by using a mixed logit 
estimation approach. Derived elasticities indicate how a change in tax and/or 
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regulation policy of one country affects not only the probability that this 
country is chosen as a location, but also how this affects the location 
probabilities of other countries. We then include a measure for bank secrecy in 
our analysis to account for banks’ incentive to follow customers to specific 
locations.  
We use financial services FDI data provided by Deutsche Bundesbank (the 
German central bank). This data allows us to identify establishments of 
German multinationals in 150 countries between 2000 and 2012. Our sample 
includes 839 MNCs that establish in total 3,790 new financial sector entities in 
83 host countries. Tax data and regulatory indices are collected from various 
sources (Global Tax Handbook, KPMG, World Development Indicator). 
2.2 Results and contribution to literature 
Our results indicate banks being highly sensitive to tax rates and the regulatory 
framework when investing in foreign countries. Using a mixed logit estimation 
approach, we find a significant impact of tax and regulation variables on 
location probabilities. A higher tax as well as a stricter regulation at the host 
country level is associated with less financial sector FDI. In addition, the 
estimation of cross-elasticities gives us insights in how policy changes affect 
the location probabilities of other countries. Another important finding of our 
analysis is that own- as well as cross-elasticities are estimated to be highly 
heterogeneous across firms and countries. Thus, tax and regulation policy may 
be used to attract financial sector FDI. In an additional analysis we find that 
banks do not only consider their own tax advantage, but also follow their 
customers to locations offering favorable conditions for them.  
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This essay contributes to a small number of studies that have investigated the 
influence of host country taxes on banking FDI (Claessens et al. 2001; 
Huizinga et al. 2014)  
A second string of literature examines how financial sector FDI is affected by 
regulation policy (e.g., Buch and Lipponer 2007; Tsai et al. 2011). Yet, we are 
notably the first study to use a discrete choice model in this context.   
3. Profit Shifting and Tax Response of Multinational Banks 
3.1 Research question and design 
The essay Profit Shifting and Tax Response of Multinational Banks explores 
the impact of taxation on banks’ reported profits and attempts to identify 
possible profit-shifting channels. While profits of a subsidiary are determined 
by several factors like the size of the economic activities, a systematic impact 
of tax incentives on reported profits can be interpreted as indirect evidence for 
profit shifting.  
In accordance with international tax principles each subsidiary of a 
multinational bank is subject to tax in its country of residence. Taxable profits 
are separately determined for each subsidiary. Therefore, international 
differences in tax rates provide an incentive to adopt strategies that are 
associated with profit shifting from high-taxed to low-taxed subsidiaries to 
minimize the overall tax payments. Previous literature has found striking 
evidence for profit shifting of non-financial multinationals (Hines and Rice 
1994; Huizinga and Laeven 2008). However, evidence on banks’ profit shifting 
is still scarce (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga 2001; Huizinga et al. 2014). 
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First, we investigate the tax elasticity of subsidiary-level earnings before taxes 
to statutory tax rates within a multinational bank. In accordance with prior 
literature our regressions use a set of control variables to single out the tax 
effect. In addition we test for possible restrictions banks face when shifting 
their profits such as transfer pricing regulation and capital constraints.  
In the second part of the paper we attempt to identify possible profit-shifting 
channels. Therefore, we trace the tax sensitivity of different profit components 
such as interest income and trading gains.  
We then test for the tax influence on potentially important profit-shifting tools. 
So far, a number of accounting studies (Greenawalt and Sinkey 1988; Beatty et 
al. 1995; Collins et al. 1995; Balboa et al. 2013) have analyzed loan loss 
provisions (LLPs) as a managerial tool in the banking industry. Tax treatment 
for loan loss provisions varies among countries with some allowing taxable 
deduction and some prohibiting them. However, all countries have in common 
that a deduction for tax purposes is possible in case the debt becomes default. 
Therefore, a strong incentive to place high risk debt in high-tax jurisdictions 
can be assumed. We use LLPs as a proxy for the allocation of credits with a 
high default risk and test for their tax sensitivity. 
We then focus on debt as a tool to shift profits. Deductibility of interest 
payments creates a clear incentive to shift profits via intracompany debt. 
Previous studies document a tax effect on financial decisions of non-financial 
multinationals (Desai et al. 2004; Huizinga et al. 2008; for a survey Feld et al. 
2013). We determine the marginal tax effect on capital structures similar to 
previous evidence (Keen and de Mooij 2012; de Mooij and Heckemeyer 2013). 
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Our data covers 2 136 bank groups for the years 2001-2012. The data used is 
partly from Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope database; tax data is hand-collected 
from various sources (Global tax handbooks, KPMG, PwC).  
3.2 Results and contribution to literature 
The results of our study confirm that banks do engage in profit shifting. 
Interestingly, the estimated coefficients are considerably higher than for non-
financial multinationals in similar settings. Investigating heterogeneity among 
profit components, we find several tax sensitive profit components and that tax 
elasticity differs across business types.  
When analyzing possible shifting channels we find the accrual of loan loss 
provisions to be significantly higher in high-tax jurisdictions. Our results 
suggest that discretionary accrual of loan loss provisions is, in fact, driven by 
tax incentives associated with the deduction of losses from default credits.  
Finally, we find a significant positive effect of host country taxes on debt 
financing of bank subsidiaries. This indicates that banks do adjust their 
leverage ratio for tax purposes, although this is limited in case of regulatory 
constraints. Yet, our results suggest that the magnitude of the tax response via 
capital structures is significantly smaller in the banking sector compared to 
previous findings for non-financial multinationals. 
The essay mainly contributes to two strings of literature. First, we add to 
previous studies analyzing profit-shifting activities of multinational companies 
(for a review cf. Heckemeyer and Overesch 2013). Second, we make a distinct 
contribution to a growing number of studies investigating banks’ tax response 
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga 2001; Huizinga et al. 2014). We add to this 
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literature by analyzing the heterogeneity of profit components. Moreover, we 
present evidence on possible shifting channels and link the importance of 
transfer-pricing regulation to banks’ tax response. 
4. Capital Injections and Aggressive Tax Planning - Can Banks  
Have It All?  
4.1 Research question and design 
The essay Capital Injections and Aggressive Tax Planning – Can Banks Have 
It All?  analyzes the impact of capital injections on banks’ tax aggressiveness. 
During the recent financial crisis a number of financial institutions received 
public funds. The characteristics varied by country and included guarantees, 
asset purchases and capital injections. Almost all countries tied conditions to 
receiving such funds. However, none of these conditions targeted tax 
aggressiveness. Nevertheless, we hypothesize that banks will reduce their tax 
aggressiveness when receiving capital by the respective government. We 
derive this assumption from previous studies reporting changes in tax 
aggressiveness in cases of state ownership (Desai et al. 2007; Desai and 
Dharmapala 2008). However, evidence on governments’ influence in 
connection with recapitalization is so far mixed. Whereas changes in lending 
behavior can be associated with receiving capital injections (Mariathasan and 
Merrouche 2012; Brei et al., 2013), banks’ risk taking seems to have been 
unaffected (Brei and Gadanecz 2012).   
In the first part of the essay we employ propensity score matching (PSM) to 
create a sufficient control group. Since treatment status is not random, PSM is 
the best option to obtain a control group as similar to our treated group as 
possible. We then measure the effect of the recapitalization treatment by 
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comparing the change in tax aggressiveness of the treatment group between 
2007 and 2011 to the counterfactual trend of the control group in absence of 
the recapitalization. By combining the strength of propensity score matching 
and difference-in-differences analysis towards causal inference our analysis is 
robust to selection on observables and unobserved time effects (Heckman et al. 
1998)  
The essay concludes with a series of robustness tests. To avoid distortion 
stemming from our event window, we conduct tests using the year 2010 
instead of 2011. Moreover, we evaluate effects for subsamples. 
Our empirical analysis is based on unique hand-collected data on capital 
injections in 10 OECD countries. It covers 93 banks, receiving funds in 2008 
and/or 2009. Our control group, which did not receive government support, 
consists of 763 banks in the respective countries. Data on capital injections is 
hand-collected. Financial statements were derived from Bankscope database, 
whereas tax data is hand-collected from various sources (Global tax 
handbooks, KPMG, PwC). 
4.2 Results and contribution to literature 
The results of our analysis indicate that capital injections had a limiting effect 
on banks’ tax aggressiveness. Difference-in-differences analysis provides 
significant evidence that recapitalized banks’ tax aggressiveness diminished 
after the crisis. We attribute this finding to governments’ underlying influence 
as shareholders and the increased attention for banks’ moral behavior. Our 
analysis shows that even though banks’ tax behavior was not addressed when 
supporting capital was paid, a voluntary reduction took place. In addition, we 
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find that banks’ receiving public funds had significantly lower ETRs in 2007. 
Various robustness tests using a different event window and a number of 
matching methods support our results. A split of our sample suggests that the 
limiting effect was especially pronounced in Europe. When testing for a solely 
US sample we do not find a significant effect.  
In the light of the recent financial crisis this paper contributes to an increasing 
number of studies focusing on recapitalized banks and their characteristics. 
Within this area we especially add to studies analyzing banks’ behavior after 
receiving public funds (Panetta et al. 2009; Mariathasan and Merrouche 2012; 
Brei et al. 2013). Furthermore, our essay contributes to accounting literature 
using the effective tax rate as a measure for tax aggressiveness (Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010) and to studies investigating governments’ influence as 
shareholders (Desai et al. 2007; Desai and Dharmapala 2008). Notably we are 
the first to link recapitalizations and banks’ tax aggressiveness. 
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1. Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) of the financial sector has substantially 
increased during the last decades. For example, the share of foreign owned 
banks jumped from 20% in 1995 to 34% in 2009.
3
 The emergence of global 
banks is closely related to the emergence of multinational companies (MNCs) 
whose international operations require services like lending, currency or cash 
management. Particularly after the recent financial crisis many countries have 
seen a need to restrict banks’ international activities. On the other hand, more 
and more global banks express their concerns about excessive compliance costs 
associated with stricter regulation. Some of them even reconsider their 
international strategies as the costs of being global seem to exceed the benefits 
thereof (see the Economist, Global banks, A world of pain, March 7
th
, 2015, p. 
59-61).   
The revelations around the so-called “Luxembourg leaks” drew even more 
attention to international banking.
4
 Several banks were involved in complex 
cross-border lending structures set up to avoid taxes and benefit from 
Luxembourg’s many tax exemptions. In addition, some banks supported their 
clients in tax evasion through Luxembourg-based subsidiaries.
5
 All this has led 
legislators of many countries to impose new and stricter regulations. For 
example, under the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) passed 
in 2010, financial institutions all over the world are supposed to exchange 
information on American clients vis à vis the US Internal Revenue Service 
                                                          
3
 Data taken from Claessen and Van Horen (2012) based on 137 countries.   
4
 Among other reports, Financial Times, November 6
th
, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl-
/cms/s/0/c8de6734-65d0-11e4-898f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3UCJyeIKz. 
5
 For example, the German Commerzbank AG was raided by tax authorities in February 2015, 
cf. Financial Times February 24
th
 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/dac3b366-bc5e-11e4-
a6d7-00144feab7de.html#axzz3Udg5CrZF.  
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(IRS) to make it more difficult for tax dodgers to hide money abroad. Another 
example is the OECD (2013) action plan against base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS) by MNCs. 
Although there is broad agreement that policy action is needed, it is not clear 
which policy measures are the most effective ones or whether they are effective 
at all. Bank regulation has so far been the dominant approach to tame risky 
banks. For example, in response to the financial crisis, the “Basel III” 
agreement of September 2010 tightened capital requirement rules to increase 
equity buffers and make the banking system more resilient to shocks. The same 
goal – discouraging low capitalization – may be achieved by designing the tax 
system such that it does not reward excessive debt financing. Keen (2011) 
provides a theoretical analysis of the interaction between regulation and 
taxation building on a seminal study by Weitzman (1974). Whereas in theory, 
tax and regulation policies may be considered perfect substitutes, practical 
considerations suggest that both policy instruments should be used.   
The efficiency of regulatory measures has been explored in a number of 
studies, especially in the context of risk taking (Admati et al. 2010; Hart and 
Zingales 2011). Several European countries followed suggestions by the IMF 
and implemented bank levies as a reaction to the financial crisis. Devereux et 
al. (2013) analyze the impact of these levies and find evidence that they indeed 
did cause an increase in capital stocks of banks. At the same time, however, 
such a levy could result in an increase of risk in a bank’s assets and therefore 
undermine the benefit of higher capital (Devereux 2014). So far, only little is 
known how such policies affect the international allocation of financial sector 
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FDI and particularly how sensitive MNCs’ location decisions respond to tax vs. 
regulation policy.    
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of financial sector 
FDI in a number of ways. First, using data on the universe of German outbound 
financial services FDI, we consider all new location choices of German MNCs 
over a time span of 13 years. Second, we analyze the effects of tax and 
regulation policy using new data on more than 150 potential host countries.
6
 
Third, we provide estimates on own- and cross-elasticities to learn about how a 
change in tax and regulation policy of one country affects not only the 
probability that this country is chosen as a location but also how this affects the 
location probabilities of other countries.  
Only very few papers have studied how taxes affect financial services FDI 
before. A recent contribution by Huizinga et al. (2014) finds that aggregated 
banking FDI is determined by host country taxes. Moreover, Claessens et al. 
(2001) find that low host country taxes are associated with additional banking 
FDI. Evidence on regulation policy and location choices of multinational banks 
is similarly scarce. While a number of papers examine how financial sector 
FDI is affected by regulation policy (e.g., Buch and Lipponer 2007; Tsai et al. 
2011), none of these papers has analyzed how regulation policy affects the 
extensive margin of foreign activity in a discrete choice model.   
Our analysis is based on financial services FDI data provided by Deutsche 
Bundesbank (the German central bank). This data allows us to identify the 
establishment of German multinationals all over the world during the period 
                                                          
6
 Only 83 countries are actually chosen by the firms in our sample.  
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2000-2012. In an average year during this period, about 250 new entities are 
established by German MNCs in foreign countries. The most important host 
countries for financial services FDI are the US, where 760 new entities have 
been established over the whole time span considered, the UK, where we count 
524 new establishments, and the Netherlands with 251 new establishments.  
Our preferred specification – using a mixed logit estimation approach – implies 
a significant impact of tax and regulation variables on location probabilities. 
We find significant heterogeneity of tax responses. For example, if the tax is 
cut by 1 percent in Great Britain (Spain), the probability of attracting financial 
sector FDI increases by about 1.1 (0.3) percent. The estimated regulation 
responses are heterogeneous, too. For example if regulation in Canada becomes 
more lenient as the country reduces capital requirements by 1 percent, the 
probability of attracting new financial sector entities from Germany is 
increased by almost 8 percent, ceteris paribus. Thus, tax and regulation policy 
may be used to attract financial sector FDI.  
Our estimation approach also allows us to compute cross-elasticities that 
suggest interesting substitution patterns. For example, if Great Britain cuts its 
local tax rate by 1 percent, Great Britain will gain (see above) at the expense of 
other countries like China, whose location probability will be reduced by 0.107 
percent. Such findings have policy implications, as uncoordinated policy action 
of one country imposes an externality on other countries. Hence, particularly 
regulation policy should be coordinated across countries.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
introduces a generic theoretical framework, which our empirical analysis is 
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based on. In Section 3 we discuss the determinants of financial sector FDI. 
Section 4 explains the empirical approach and describes the data. Empirical 
results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2. The Extensive Margin of Financial Sector FDI  
Our empirical analysis is based on a theoretical concept of comparison of 
expected profits across alternatives (countries).
7
 Let us denote profits of a 
multinational firm b arising at a foreign financial services entity established in 
country j as 𝜋𝑏𝑗
∗ . The asterisk indicates that 𝜋𝑏𝑗 is a latent variable, which is not 
observed by the researcher. The actual choice of firm b – the location choice or 
extensive margin of foreign investment activity – is based on the maximum 
attainable profit when choosing one of j = 0,1,2,…,J  potential host countries: 
𝜋𝑏 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝜋𝑏0
∗ , 𝜋𝑏1
∗ , 𝜋𝑏2
∗ , … , 𝜋𝑏𝐽
∗ ) 
 
The actual choice 𝜋𝑏 takes on value one in the respective alternative chosen, 
{0,1,…,J}. Thus, above equation suggests that all variables affecting 𝜋𝑏𝑗
∗  will 
determine in which country b is locating its foreign business. We may say that 
any generic variable 𝑥𝑗  that positively affects profits, 
𝜕𝜋𝑏𝑗
∗
𝜕𝑥𝑗
> 0, will make it 
more likely to increase the probability that b chooses a particular location. The 
potential determinants 𝑥𝑗 affecting  𝜋𝑏𝑗
∗  will be discussed in the following 
sections.  
 
                                                          
7
 This has been introduced by McFadden (1974) who showed that an empirical discrete choice 
model – as the one we are using in this paper – can be obtained from a theoretical model of 
utility comparison.   
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3. Determinants of Financial Sector FDI  
Previous literature on the determinants of financial sector FDI has mainly 
focused on foreign investments of multinational banks. One part of this 
literature has examined which banks become multinational and found that the 
size of a bank (Focarelli and Pozollo 2001; Clarke et al. 2003; Buch und 
Lipponer 2007; Temesvary 2014a), its balance sheet health (Popov and Udell 
2012), and its productivity (Buch et al. 2014) are particularly important 
determinants. This paper is interested in how a financial services firm chooses 
a location for its foreign activity. The following sections will present an 
overview on the literature that identified a number of host-country 
characteristics that seem to be important determinants for location decisions of 
multinational banks.
8
    
3.1 Determinants of Financial Services FDI   
Many determinants of goods trade and FDI will be similarly important in 
context of financial services FDI.  First, the distance between host country and 
home country of a firm is considered to be one major driver of economic 
integration. While in case of goods trade, distance is associated with 
transportation costs, distance seems to be important for financial services as it 
affects the availability and quality of information. The specific business model 
of banks requires collecting and processing information on customers to 
provide financial services on competitive terms (Rajan 1992; Petersen and 
Rajan 2002). Thus, a lower distance between the home country and the host 
country of an investment should be favorable since this reduces information 
                                                          
8
 In these studies, the role of policy instruments like tax and regulation policies are often 
neglected, however.  
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asymmetries between headquarters or parents and foreign entities (Berger et al. 
2004; Liberti and Mian 2009). Several studies found empirical evidence for 
distance as an important determinant of investment locations (Focarelli and 
Pozzolo 2005; Buch and Lipponer 2007; Claessens and van Horen 2014). As 
more and more companies started to export to foreign markets and became 
multinational firms, financial services across borders became more important 
as well. Several studies demonstrate that foreign activities of banks and 
bilateral trade volumes between countries are positively correlated (Brealey 
and Kaplanis 1996; Yamori 1998; Buch 2000; Berger et al. 2004; Focarelli and 
Pozzolo 2001, 2005). Other determinants of foreign banking relate to cultural 
characteristics such as common language, which should facilitate the 
successful market entry in a host country. Evidence suggests that cultural 
variables are more or less important determinants of international banking, 
depending on the empirical specification (Buch 2003; Focarelli and Pozzolo 
2005). Moreover, a wide range of host-country characteristics that affect the 
profitability of foreign entities should have an impact on the location choice of 
financial services firms. For example, previous studies show that market size 
and GDP per capita are associated with additional bank FDI (Yamori 1998; 
Buch 2000; Claessens et al. 2001; Cerruti et al. 2007). Focarelli and Pozzolo 
(2001; 2005) identify expected economic growth in the host country and local 
bank inefficiencies as additional determinants of location choices. 
Finally, very recent literature focuses on the effects of the financial crisis on 
banking sector FDI. Several studies find a decline in foreign activities 
associated with the financial crisis (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2009, 2011; 
Temesvary 2014a, 2014b). Buch et al. (2014) provide evidence that the 
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changing market conditions triggered by the financial crisis led banks to lower 
their international assets. In addition, they identify policy interventions and 
banks’ increasing sensitivity towards financial frictions as main drivers behind 
this reduction.  
3.2 Bank Regulation   
One argument often used in policy debate is that deregulation policy has been 
responsible for the rampant expansion of banking across the world (Buch 
2003).
9
 In line with this view, regulatory requirements are expected to increase 
market entry costs and deter foreign activity (Lehner 2009; Tsai et al. 2011). In 
a similar way, if regulators impose high capital (equity) requirements and 
liquidity rules, this should unambiguously increase a bank’s cost of capital and 
therefore have a negative effect on foreign activity. On the other hand, 
enhanced transparency through tight government regulation and supervision 
might reduce aforementioned information asymmetries and could even 
facilitate foreign activity. Buch (2003) argues that the effect of regulatory 
requirements might also differ across countries, and finds a limiting effect of 
tighter regulation on foreign activity, on average.  
Buch and Lipponer (2007) confirm a negative relationship between bank FDI 
and higher capital controls. However, a tight regulatory supervisory system in 
the host country does not necessarily limit foreign FDI.  Buch and DeLong 
(2004) argue that the effect of information costs on banks’ cross-border 
mergers is far more pronounced than the effect of regulation costs. Temesvary 
(2014a; 2014b) examines a sample of US banks and the effects of host-country 
                                                          
9
Moreover, research has been concerned in the relationship between deregulation and excessive 
risk taking (Keeley 1990; Hovakimian and Kane 2000; Admati et al. 2010; Hart and Zingales 
2011). 
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characteristics on foreign banking activities. Her results indicate that market 
entry costs, which in her sample are associated with regulatory constraints, 
have a negative impact on banks’ foreign activities. In contrast, Bertus et al. 
(2008) find no connection between foreign bank ownership and the regulatory 
framework in a particular country.  
3.3 Taxation 
Corporate income taxes reduce the return on investment available for the 
shareholder. In an international context, a foreign affiliate of a multinational 
firm is subject to tax in its host country. Therefore, a low tax at the host 
location is associated with higher residual income that can be distributed to the 
parent firm. The repatriation of income is then usually exempt from home 
country taxation.
10
 A number of studies have analyzed the influence of taxes on 
FDI (for reviews cf. De Mooij and Ederveen 2003, 2005; Feld and Heckemeyer 
2011). Only relatively few papers analyzed how taxes affect the extensive 
margin of foreign activity by focusing on location decisions of multinational 
firms. These studies provide evidence that host country taxes exert a negative 
effect on location probabilities (Devereux and Griffith 1998; Grubert and Mutti 
2004; Büttner and Ruf 2005; Büttner and Wamser 2009; Barrios et al. 2012).   
While none of the studies mentioned above considers financial sector FDI, the 
findings in Overesch and Wamser (2009) suggest that financial sector FDI is 
particularly responsive to taxes. The study distinguishes between FDI from 
different industries among them financial services. The results show that the 
                                                          
10
 Only the US and a small number of other countries consider all types of foreign income as 
part of taxable profits of the parent corporation. At the same time, these countries usually 
provide tax credits on taxes paid abroad. This system is, however, not relevant for our paper, as 
Germany exempts all foreign income from taxation in the home country.   
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responses to host country taxes differ significantly across different business 
activities. Although their data does not include multinational banks, their 
estimates suggest a particularly strong effect of corporate taxes on location 
choices of subsidiaries that provide financial services within multinational 
firms. To the best of our knowledge, only two more studies have analyzed the 
impact of taxes on FDI of multinational banks. Claessens et al. (2001) find a 
negative relationship between host country tax rate and banking FDI. Huizinga 
et al. (2014) find that international double taxation of dividends reduces 
banking FDI. However, these studies use information about bank assets, while 
our paper focusses on the question of how taxes affect the choice among 
alternative locations when setting up a new foreign financial services entity.     
4. Empirical Approach and Data 
4.1 Mixed Logit  
We are interested in the determinants of location choices of multinational 
banks and particularly how taxes and regulation affect these choices. We base 
our empirical analysis on a mixed logit model, which is associated with a 
number of favorable features that are important with respect to the specific 
research goals we have in this paper. In particular, the two main advantages are 
(i) that the mixed logit allows us to learn about (realistic) substitution patterns 
across alternatives and (ii) that it allows for correlation in unobserved factors 
across alternatives (countries). 
A very intuitive interpretation of the mixed logit model is one of error 
components creating correlations among the profits for different alternatives 
(see Train 2009). As outlined in Section 2, the underlying model we have in 
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mind when multinational firm b chooses a foreign location is one where the 
firm maximizes profits 𝜋𝑏𝑗
∗ .     
Let us neglect the asterisk we used to denote latent variables and specify profits 
of multinational bank b relating to alternative (country) j as 
𝜋𝑏𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼
′𝑥𝑏𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑏
′ 𝑧𝑏𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑗𝑡.    (1) 
The vectors 𝑥𝑏𝑗𝑡  and 𝑧𝑏𝑗𝑡  denote observed country-j-specific characteristics. 
While 𝛼  is a vector of fixed coefficients to be estimated, 𝜇𝑏  is a vector of 
random terms with zero mean, and 𝜀𝑏𝑗𝑡 is an iid extreme value random term. 
To the extent that 𝑥𝑏𝑗𝑡  and 𝑧𝑏𝑗𝑡 are indexed by t, we allow each of these 
variables to depend on the respective observables in a given year t. We will 
also consider that one firm may face different choice situations over time, but 
then treat coefficients 𝜇𝑏  that enter utility as constant for each b. Of course, 
since 𝜇𝑏  is indexed by multinational b, coefficients vary across firms. One of 
the key issues in specifying this model is the choice of 𝑧𝑏𝑗𝑡. Together with 𝜀𝑏𝑗𝑡, 
𝑧𝑏𝑗𝑡  defines the stochastic portion of profits as 𝜃𝑏𝑗𝑡 = 𝜇𝑏
′ 𝑧𝑏𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑗𝑡  (Train 
2009). By specifying 𝑧𝑏𝑗𝑡 , we allow for correlation across alternatives 
(countries),
11
 so that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜃𝑏𝑖𝑡, 𝜃𝑏𝑗𝑡) = 𝐸(𝜇𝑏
′ 𝑧𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑖𝑡)(𝜇𝑏
′ 𝑧𝑏𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑏𝑗𝑡) =
𝑧𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ 𝑊𝑧𝑏𝑗𝑡, with 𝑊 being the covariance of 𝜇𝑏.  
The specific variables included in 𝑥𝑏𝑗𝑡  and 𝑧𝑏𝑗𝑡  are discussed in more detail 
below. While 𝑥𝑏𝑗𝑡  will capture country characteristics such as the log of a 
                                                          
11
 The conditional logit does not allow for correlation in the unobserved parts of  𝜋𝑏𝑗
∗ , which 
gives rise to the so-called IIA (independence from irrelevant alternatives) assumption. Besides 
providing consistent estimates on tax and regulation variables, we are particularly interested in 
substitution patterns across countries. Hence, we need to relax this assumption as it would 
imply a proportional shifting pattern across alternatives. 
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country’s GDP or the geographical distance to Germany, the specification of 
𝑧𝑏𝑗𝑡 is important as these variables induce correlation over alternatives. Sine 
we are interested in cross-country elasticities related to tax and bank regulation 
policy, 𝑧𝑏𝑗𝑡 includes country j’s tax rate and different measures for regulation. 
In the presence of profit shifting, if MNCs operate internal capital markets or if 
other intra-firm relations are important, it is highly likely that these variables 
induce correlation across alternatives’ unobserved parts.12  
4.2 Financial Services FDI Data  
Our empirical analysis is based on the micro-level dataset MiDi (Micro 
Database Direct Investment) provided by Deutsche Bundesbank (the German 
central bank). MiDi is a panel dataset on foreign direct investment positions of 
German investors. It basically records information about the investment 
object’s balance sheet, some information on the type of investment (e.g., 
industry), and limited information on the investor. Particularly noteworthy 
concerning this data is that German law enforces collection of foreign activity 
of German investors,
13
 which enables us to observe virtually all German 
outbound activity.  
While MiDi reports foreign investments across all different industries, we will 
focus on a sub-sample of financial services entities of German multinationals. 
To be included in our dataset, the latter are required to have a direct 
participating interest in the foreign entity of more than 50% (majority owners). 
                                                          
12
 Another interpretation of the mixed logit model is one of a random coefficient model. It 
seems highly likely that firms respond very heterogeneously to taxes, depending on the extent 
to which firms can avoid taxes, for example.   
13
 Section 26 of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz) in connection 
with the Foreign Trade and Payment Regulations (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung). 
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However, the German headquarters do not necessarily have to operate in the 
financial sector. These restrictions leave us with 839 MNCs that establish 
3,790 new financial sector entities (between 2000 and 2012) in 83 host 
countries.
14
 The vast majority of foreign entities are legally independent 
subsidiaries (3,546 ones) only few are set up as branches.  
For each of the 3,790 newly established subsidiaries, we consider which 
location is effectively chosen among the 83 potential host countries. As our 
dependent variable we compute an indicator variable LOCDECbjt that equals 1 
for the location effectively chosen and zero for the 82 alternative host countries 
not selected. Considering the information of all location choices in the financial 
sector between 2000 and 2012, our sample includes 309,912 observations.
15
 
4.3 Tax and Regulation Data  
Regarding tax incentives we consider the statutory corporate tax rate, STRjt, to 
capture expected tax payments in a host country of foreign entities.
16
 This 
variable is collected by the authors from different sources (International Bureau 
of Fiscal Documentation, IBFD; tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC, 
and KPMG). Another tax variable is DTTjt which measures the total number of 
double taxation treaties concluded by a host country j. This variable is 
available from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) and is included as a tightly-knit network of DTTs may facilitate 
                                                          
14
 An overview is givien in table 2.7,see  appendix. 
15
 The total number of observations is not 314,570 (=3,790 ∙ 83) due to missing control 
variables for some country-year pairs. 
16
 Concerning Luxemburg, we assume a statutory tax rate of zero due to Luxembourg’s known 
holding regimes and ruling system. However, alternative regressions in which we excluded 
Luxemburg confirm our results. 
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cross-border capital flows of dividends, interest, and royalties, which might be 
important for the multinational bank.  
To account for host countries’ regulatory framework we rely on three different 
variables. First, RATIOjt measures the equity ratio required in the respective 
host country. This variable was taken from several waves of a survey 
conducted by Barth et al. (2001).
17
 Since increased equity requirements are 
usually assumed to impose a cost on firms, we expect a negative effect on 
foreign activities. In our data, RATIOjt varies between 0.05 and 0.19. Many 
countries impose minimum equity ratios as suggested by Basel II regulation 
(0.08), some countries like Nigeria or the United Arab Emirates require 
significantly higher equity ratios (0.19 and 0.12).  
The second measure we use to capture the regulatory environment is called 
REGjt.
18
 This variable is also based on an index developed by Barth et al.’s 
(2001) survey. It consists of four components indicating the strictness of 
jurisdictions when banks engage in financial activities. To be specific, REGjt is 
defined as the sum over the four variables RSECjt, RINSjt, RREALjt, and 
RNONFINjt. Each of these variables is increasing in the strictness of how a 
country j is regulating banks’activities in securities (RSECjt), insurance 
(RINSjt), real estate (RREALjt), or non-financial (RNONFINjt). Strictness is 
measured by scores ranging from 1 to 4.
19
 Our variable REGjt combines all four 
categories into one measure. Higher values in REGjt are associated with a less 
                                                          
17
 The survey was repeated with the current 4th round being published in 2012.  
18
 Cerruti et al. (2007) and Tsai et al. (2011) use the index in a similar context. 
19
 A value of 1 for RSECjt, as an example, indicates that a full range of securities activities can 
be conducted directly by banks. The strictest value which equals 4 indicates that none of these 
activities can be done in either banks or their subsidiaries in the respective country. 
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attractive location for banks. In our data, Indonesia exhibits the highest value 
(16) of REGjt.  
Since banks are not only incentivized by their own tax planning opportunities 
they may also have good reason to establish branches and subsidiaries in 
locations favored by their clients. Therefore, in additional specifications, we 
add BANKSECj to account for the level of secrecy of the respective location 
when it comes to tax issues.
20
 
It may be interesting to see how regulation policy relates to tax policy. To do 
this, we have produced Figures 2.1 and 2.2. In both figures, STRj (averaged 
over all years in our sample) is displayed on the horizontal axis, while the 
measures for regulation are displayed on the vertical axes (RATIOj in Figure 
2.1; REGj in Figure 2.2). Very surprisingly, it seems that regulation policy is 
only weakly (negatively) related to tax policy in case of RATIOj, although the 
linear prediction implies a weak negative correlation: higher taxes may allow 
for laxer regulation. Both figures illustrate that there is a lot of variation across 
countries across all measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 We use this variable only in robustness tests. The reason is that due to a poor coverage 
across countries, we lose about half of the observations compared to our basic specification.   
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FIGURE 2.1: TAX vs. regulation policy (RATIO) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.2: TAX vs. regulation policy (REG) 
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4.4 Non-Tax and Non-Regulation Determinants  
In line with existing work on the determinants of FDI, we consider the 
following non-tax and non-regulation variables. First, to capture the size of the 
local market, we use (log)GDPjt. Second, the growth of GDP in country j, 
GDPgrowthjt, is included to capture growth possibilities. Both variables are 
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. In addition, we 
use variables to control for cultural and geographical distance between 
Germany (the country of the investors) and host countries j. The geographical 
distance is denoted by (log)DISTj, CONTj and COMLANGj are dummy 
variables indicating whether host country j shares a common border with 
Germany (CONTj) and whether German is an official language in the host 
country (COMLANGj). More distant countries (in geographical distance and 
cultural distance) are expected to attract less FDI. In particular, as 
communication and information exchange is important in context of financial 
services FDI, we expect these variables to be important determinants with a 
negative expected sign for (log)DISTj; CONTj and COMLANGj should  
positively relate to the probability that country j is chosen. All latter three 
variables are taken from the Centre d’Études prospectives et d’Informations 
Internatinales (CEPII).  
Similar to the DTT variable as introduced above, we use the number of 
bilateral investment treaties concluded by country j, BITjt. Bilateral investment 
treaties have been shown to be an effective policy instrument to attract FDI as 
they reduce foreign market entry cost (Egger and Merlo 2012). BITs may be 
less relevant, however, in the context of financial sector FDI. The information 
on BITs is taken from UNCTAD.  
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5. Results  
Table 2.1 presents basic results from mixed logit estimations. As argued above, 
we specify tax and regulation variables as random (STRjt, RATIOjt, REGjt), 
while all other control variables are defined as fixed. The results show that tax 
and regulation responses are heterogeneous across firms (see also the highly 
significant estimates for the standard deviations), but the mean coefficients are 
estimated with the expected signs: A higher tax at location j leads to less 
financial sector FDI, stricter regulation in form of stricter capital requirements, 
as well as higher values of the regulation index are associated with less 
financial sector FDI. The estimated coefficients for the variables entering as 
fixed are in line with theoretical expectations. Only the negative estimate for 
GDPgrowthjt may seem unusual. One explanation for this is that more growth 
allows local and multinational firms to finance locally or out of own earnings. 
Another explanation may be that financial sector FDI often goes to developed 
countries which exhibit usually rather low or modest GDP growth rates. Less 
distant countries in terms of cultural distance (COMLANGj) between Germany 
and host country j as well as geographical distance (DISTj) increase the 
probability to be chosen as host country, as expected. 
Before providing some quantitative interpretations of these results, we may 
look at predicted base probabilities for a country to be chosen as a host 
location. Table 2.2 shows that the base probability is predicted to be relatively 
low (below 1 percent) for countries like Australia (AUS = 0.0061), Hong Kong 
(HKG = 0.0070) or Singapore (SGP = 0.0046), and relatively high for 
countries like the United States (USA = 0.0955), Austria (AUT = 0.0368) or 
Belgium (BEL = 0.0483). However, the country for which we predict the 
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highest base probability is Great Britain, for which we estimate a base 
probability that exceeds 10 percent.    
TABLE 2.1:  Basic Results 
 (1) (2) 
 
Coefficients 
specified as 
random: 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
 
 
SD 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
 
 
SD 
 
 
STRjt -5.364*** 7.642*** -5.081*** 8.149*** 
 (0.461) (0.482) (0.470) (0.804) 
RATIOjt -55.27*** 42.58***  -58.07*** 45.50***  
 (5.90) (4.08) (5.72) (4.24) 
REGjt    -0.107*** 0.165***  
   (0.015) (0.016) 
 
Coefficients 
specified as  
fixed:  
 
    
lnGDPjt 0.779***  0.784***  
 (0.028)  (0.028)  
GDP growthjt -0.050***  -0.052***  
 (0.009)  (0.009)  
lnDISTjt -0.529***  -0.376***  
 (0.032)  (0.037)  
COMLANGjt 0.833***  0.821***  
 (0.074)  (0.074)  
CONTIGjt -0.298***  -0.018  
 (0.066)  (0.070)  
DTTjt 0.013***  0.013***  
 (0.001)  (0.002)  
BITjt -0.009***  -0.009***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
     
     
N 309,912  309,912  
Notes: Mixed logit estimates; 3,790 positive location choices. Random variables: STR is the statutory 
corporate tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country. RATIO equals the minimum equity ratio required in 
the host country. REG is an indicator for restrictions in different activities. Fixed variables: lnGDP is host 
country GDP in logs, GDP growth indicates yearly growth in host country GDP. lnDIST is the distance 
between home country and host country in logs. COMLANG is a dummy variable indicating a common 
official language. CONTIG is a dummy variable for a common boarder. DTT and BIT equal the number 
of double tax treaties and bilateral investment treaties of the host country respectively. *,**, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. More information concerning control variables is 
provided in Table 2.6 in the Appendix.  
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TABLE 2.2: Estimated Base Probabilities for 12 Selected Countries  
Country Base Prob. Country Base Prob. Country Base Prob. 
AUS 0.0061 CHN 0.0216 IRL 0.0357 
AUT 0.0368 ESP 0.0231 RUS 0.0232 
BEL 0.0483 GBR 0.1241 SGP 0.0046 
CAN 0.0231 HKG 0.0070 USA 0.0955 
 
 
 
5.1 Own- and Cross-Elasticities for Changes in Tax and Regulation 
Variables 
Our estimation approach not only allows us to find out about how a change in a 
policy variable of country j affects the probability to locate in country j, it also 
allows us to find out about substitution elasticities across alternatives 
(countries). For example, we may answer questions of the following type: How 
does a 1 percent change in taxes in the US affect the probability to locate in the 
US, in Canada, or in the UK. We present estimates on own- and cross 
elasticities for a number of countries in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Before discussing 
the results, let us look at the formal representation of how a change in the mth 
element of the vector of explanatory variables of one country, say j, affects the 
location probability of country i (see Train 2009). Expressed as elasticity, the 
percentage change in the probability is given by 
𝐸𝑏𝑖𝑥𝑏𝑗
𝑚 = −
𝑥𝑏𝑗
𝑚
𝑃𝑏𝑖
∫ 𝛽𝑚𝐿𝑏𝑖(𝛽)𝐿𝑏𝑗𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽 = −𝑥𝑏𝑗
𝑚 ∫ 𝛽𝑚𝐿𝑏𝑖(𝛽)𝐿𝑏𝑗𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present own- and cross-elasticities for STR and RATIO and 
the same selection of countries as in Table 2.2. The tables are organized such 
that each cell provides the tax or regulation effect on a country in a row with 
respect to a 1 percent increase of STR (RATIO) of the country in a column. For 
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example, if Singapore reduces its tax rate by 1 percent, all other countries lose 
in terms of lower location probabilities. However, our estimation approach 
allows that the reduction in probability mass is heterogeneously distributed 
across countries, i.e. some countries lose more (e.g., Hong Kong) than others 
(e.g., Belgium). The bold diagonal elements in the respective table denote own-
elasticities. For example, if the tax is cut by 1 percent in Great Britain (GRB), 
the probability of attracting financial sector FDI increases by about 1.01 
percent. Although a tax of a given country usually comes at the cost of other 
countries (one country attracts FDI at the expense of others), our results 
suggest interesting complementarities for some country-relations.  For 
example, while we expect a US-tax-cut-policy to attract new financial services 
entities, there seem to be positive spillovers to other countries. In particular, 
countries that are associated with a high cultural or geographical proximity to 
the US (as Australia or Canada) benefit from lower taxes there. Such 
complementarities are in line with learning arguments that arise within 
multinational firm networks (Egger et al. 2014a). 
Table 2.4 further suggests that the responsiveness of German financial services 
FDI to regulation at the extensive margin is highly sensitive, expressed in form 
of elasticities. The estimated own-elasticities range from about 4 (RUS) to 9.2 
(SGP). For example, a 1 percent lower capital ratio (a 1 percent lower equity 
requirement) imposed by Great Britain is estimated to increase the probability 
to locate there by about 5.3 percent. The estimates confirm that RATIO is an 
extremely important determinant of location choice and that locations with lax 
capital requirements are particularly attractive for German MNCs. Other than 
in case of STR, the estimated cross-elasticities are negative, irrespective of the 
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country combination. Given the way how we have specified the vector of 
random variables, and given significant differences in countries’ tax incentives, 
the finding of (some) positive tax-cross-elasticities (and throughout negative 
regulation-cross-elasticities at the same time) is fully consistent with profit-
shifting considerations. In fact, the latter explains why tax responses differ in 
the first place (Egger et al. 2014b).  
TABLE 2.3: Own- and Cross-Elasticities of a One-Percent Tax Cut for a 
Selection of Countries 
 
AUS AUT BEL CAN CHN ESP GBR HKG IRL RUS SGP USA 
AUS 1,148 -0,463 -0,024 -0,117 -0,318 -0,006 -0,120 -0,081 -0,030 -0,025 -0,007 0,003 
AUT -0,009 1,418 -0,048 -0,021 -0,028 -0,018 -0,206 -0,015 -0,045 -0,042 -0,010 -0,027 
BEL -0,003 -0,029 0,575 0,006 -0,013 0,015 -0,068 -0,006 -0,021 -0,019 -0,004 0,091 
CAN -0,003 -0,025 0,013 0,509 -0,015 0,018 -0,061 -0,006 -0,020 -0,016 -0,005 0,111 
CHN -0,009 -0,044 -0,036 -0,020 1,357 -0,014 -0,107 -0,007 -0,031 -0,021 -0,012 -0,056 
ESP -0,013 -0,022 0,029 0,017 -0,010 0,287 -0,039 -0,006 -0,018 -0,014 -0,005 0,145 
GBR -0,006 -0,060 -0,033 -0,014 -0,019 -0,010 1,078 -0,012 -0,036 -0,037 -0,007 -0,006 
HKG -0,013 -0,132 -0,093 -0,040 -0,037 -0,042 -0,357 1,626 -0,091 -0,082 -0,019 -0,081 
IRL -0,015 -0,122 -0,093 -0,044 -0,052 -0,040 -0,336 -0,028 1,320 -0,075 -0,019 -0,109 
RUS -0,008 -0,078 -0,057 -0,024 -0,024 -0,021 -2,360 -0,017 -0,051 1,523 -0,009 -0,043 
SGP -0,014 -0,109 -0,076 -0,042 -0,079 -0,046 -0,251 -0,023 -0,076 -0,052 1,826 -0,109 
USA 0,000 -0,008 0,040 0,023 -0,010 0,032 -0,005 -0,002 0,011 -0,006 -0,003 0,085 
 
TABLE 2.4: Own- and Cross-Elasticities of a One-Percent Lower Capital 
Requirement Tax Cut for a Selection of Countries  
 AUS AUT BEL CAN CHN ESP GBR HKG IRL RUS SGP USA 
AUS 8,218 -0,318 -0,430 -0,211 -0,207 -0,209 -0,846 -0,058 -0,216 -0,091 -0,050 -0,749 
AUT -0,056 7,352 -0,428 -0,198 -0,143 -0,209 -1,015 -0,091 -0,283 -0,128 -0,060 -0,548 
BEL -0,060 -0,336 6,995 -0,236 -0,154 -0,250 -0,974 -0,058 -0,180 -0,100 -0,038 -0,760 
CAN -0,058 -0,306 -0,463 7,716 -0,171 -0,249 -0,901 -0,048 -0,173 -0,092 -0,039 -0,819 
CHN -0,063 -0,244 -0,335 -0,187 7,246 -0,162 -0,589 -0,042 -0,207 -0,064 -0,070 -0,880 
ESP -0,058 -0,325 -0,492 -0,251 -0,150 7,634 -0,969 -0,052 -0,160 -0,095 -0,043 -0,797 
GBR -0,052 -0,363 -0,444 -0,206 -0,117 -0,223 5,396 -0,079 -0,249 -0,130 -0,043 -0,546 
HKG -0,045 -0,392 -0,326 -1,378 -0,111 -0,148 -0,957 8,337 -0,416 -0,152 -0,082 -0,301 
IRL -0,045 -0,335 -0,276 -0,133 -0,144 -0,122 -0,846 -0,115 7,136 -0,140 -0,076 -0,326 
RUS -0,019 -0,155 -0,157 -0,072 -0,047 -0,074 -0,454 -0,042 -0,144 3,875 -0,017 -0,178 
SGP -0,062 -0,405 -0,338 -0,175 -0,286 -0,194 -0,846 -0,129 -0,434 -0,097 9,205 -0,492 
USA -0,061 -0,246 -0,447 -0,248 -0,242 -0,240 -0,707 -0,028 -0,117 -0,061 -0,032 5,352 
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5.2 Robustness  
Table 2.5 includes 2 additional robustness specifications. In column (1) we add 
an indicator variable for a high level of bank secrecy taken from the OECD 
(2006). Since information about bank secrecy is not available for all countries, 
we can only consider a slightly smaller set of locations as in Table 2.1. 
However, almost all important host countries with a significant number of new 
financial service entities are still included. We find a positive effect of bank 
secrecy on financial sector location decisions.   
The second important finding is that the results for the tax rate and bank 
regulation variables are hardly affected: Table 2.5 still suggests a significant 
negative effect of a higher tax rate and higher capital requirement on the 
probability to set up a new entity in a certain country. Moreover, a high score 
for the overall level of bank regulation, indicating strict limitations, is again 
associated with a smaller probability to choose a host country.    
In specification (2) of Table 2.5 we analyze if all regulation components affect 
location choices.  Our results suggest that location choices are particularly 
responsive to restrictions of securities transactions but also to limitations of 
activities outside the financial sector, while restrictions of insurance activities 
and real estate transactions do not matter. Once again, our findings concerning 
taxes and capital requirements remain quite robust.       
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TABLE 2.5:  Robustness Checks  
 (1) (2) 
 
Coefficients specified 
as random: 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
 
 
SD 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
 
 
SD 
 
 
STRjt -3.34*** 7.35*** -2.182*** 5.983*** 
 (0.47) (0.48) (0.504) (0.391) 
RATIOjt -42.48*** 29.17***  -26.08*** 22.93***  
 (6.06) (4.09) (5.42) (6.82) 
REGjt -0.048*** 0.174***    
 (0.014) (0.014)   
RSECjt   0.259*** 0.460***  
   (0.054) (0.069) 
RINSjt   -0.026 0.557***  
   (0.042) (0.049) 
RREALjt   0.030 0.467***  
   (0.032) (0.038) 
RNONFINjt   -0.321*** 0.048  
   (0.037) (0.066) 
 
Coefficients specified 
as  
fixed:  
 
    
lnGDPjt 0.865***  0.809***  
 (0.032)  (0.032)  
GDPgrowthjt -0.038***  -0.054***  
 (0.011)  (0.012)  
lnDISTjt -0.734***  -0.723***  
 (0.050)  (0.050)  
COMLANGjt -0.124  -0.061  
 (0.096)  (0.104)  
CONTIGjt -0.335***  -0.397***  
 (0.075)  (0.080)  
DTTjt 0.008***  0.010***  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
BITjt -0.012***  -0.014***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
BANKSECj 1.461***  1.516***  
  (0.101)  (0.110)  
     
N 150,563  150,563  
Notes: Mixed logit estimates; 3,501 positive location choices. Random variables: STR is the statutory 
corporate tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country. RATIO equals the minimum equity ratio required in the 
host country. REG is an indicator for restrictions in different activities. RSEC, RINS, RREAL and 
RNONFIN are components of REG.  Fixed variables: lnGDP is host country GDP in logs, GDP growth 
indicates yearly growth in host country GDP. lnDIST is the distance between home country and host country 
in logs. COMLANG is a dummy variable indicating a common official language. CONTIG is a dummy 
variable for a common boarder. DTT and BIT equal the number of double tax treaties and bilateral 
investment treaties of the host country respectively. BANKSEC is a dummy variable indicating the existence 
of high bank secrecy in the host country.  *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
More information concerning control variables is provided in Table 2.6 in the Appendix. 
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6. Conclusion 
We have analyzed how the location of financial sector FDI is affected by taxes 
and the regulatory environment. For the empirical analysis, we have considered 
novel data, covering the universe of German outbound financial sector FDI 
over a time span of 13 years. Our results suggest that not only regulation but 
also tax incentives matter for the location of financial sector FDI.  
Our empirical approach also computes cross-elasticities for tax incentives and 
regulation. We find that a change in tax and regulation policy of one country 
affects the location probabilities of other countries. Another important finding 
of our analysis is that own- as well as cross-elasticities are estimated to be 
highly heterogeneous across firms and countries. For example, expressed in 
elasticities, we find that US financial sector FDI is less responsive to tax and 
regulation policy compared to financial sector FDI in countries like Singapore 
or Hong Kong. 
Our findings have interesting policy implications. First, given that recent 
discussions in the context of financial sector FDI often focus on regulation 
policy, our results suggest that policy makers may place more emphasis on tax 
policy. Second, our findings confirm the expectation that the responsiveness to 
tax and regulation policies varies across host countries. Third, the result of 
significant externalities arising from uncoordinated policies implies that 
coordinated action, particularly in regulation policy, is needed.  
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Appendix  
TABLE 2.6: Variable Description 
Variable Definition Source 
LOCDEC Dependent variable indicating 
location decision 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
lnGDP Gross domestic product of host 
country (in logs) 
World Bank: World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI) Database  
GDPgrowth Annual growth rate of gross 
domestic product of host 
country 
World Bank: World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI) Database 
COMLANG 0-1 dummy variable for the 
existence of a common 
language 
Centre d’Études 
prospecitves et 
d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII)  
lnDIST Log of distance between home 
country and host country 
Centre d’Études 
prospecitves et 
d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII)  
CONT 0-1 dummy variable for the 
existence of a common boarder 
Centre d’Études 
prospecitves et 
d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII)  
DTT Number of double tax treaties United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 
BIT Number of bilateral investment 
treaties 
United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 
BANKSEC 0-1 dummy variable for the 
existence of high bank secrecy 
OECD (2006) 
STR Statutory tax rate International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation, 
IBFD; tax survey provided 
by Ernst&Young, PwC and 
KPMG 
RATIO Minimum equity required in 
host country 
Barth et al. (2001) 
RSEC Indicator on conditions to 
engage in securities activities 
Barth et al. (2001) 
RINS Indicator on conditions to 
engage in insurance activities 
Barth et al. (2001) 
RREAL Indicator on conditions to 
engage in real estate activities  
Barth et al. (2001) 
RNONFIN Indicator on conditions to 
engage in non-financial 
activites  
Barth et al. (2001) 
REG Combined indicator on 
conditions to engage in 
securities, insurance,  real 
estate, non-financials 
Barth et al. (2001) 
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TABLE 2.7: Country Overview of Location Decisions 
  
Country Number of location decisions 
USA 760 
GB 524 
NL  251 
LUX 239 
I,F, PL, CH,AT, CAY >100 
Singapore, Canada, RUS, IRL, B, SP >50 
Malta/Hong Kong/Singapore >40 
Cyprus 10 
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1. Introduction 
When G20 leaders met in Pittsburgh in 2009 to discuss the still ongoing 
financial crisis they requested the IMF to investigate “…how the financial 
sector could make a fair and substantial contribution toward paying for any 
burden associated with government interventions to repair the banking system” 
(IMF 2010). Thereafter, various tax measures to improve regulation of capital 
structure as well as possibilities to shift part of the crisis related costs from 
taxpayers to the financial sector have been discussed.  
Very recently, a public debate on what the OECD (2013) denotes “base erosion 
and profit shifting” (BEPS) has been stirred up by aggressive tax planning of 
some very prominent companies mainly from the IT and retail sector. 
Interestingly, the financial sector is not at the heart of this recent discussion. 
One reason might be the scarce empirical evidence on banks’ tax response. We 
therefore aim at evaluating the status quo of banks’ response to international 
taxation.  
Profit shifting activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) have long been 
subject to extensive research. The literature provides striking evidence for 
profit shifting (cf. Hines and Rice 1994; Huizinga and Laeven 2008) and tax 
effects on capital structures (cf. Desai et al. 2004; Huizinga et al. 2008). 
However the financial sector has been left out in all of these studies. To the 
best of our knowledge we have only limited evidence for profit shifting within 
banks so far. Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) conclude that foreign banks 
pay lower taxes in several developed countries and therefore suspect them to 
engage in profit shifting. Huizinga et al. (2014) consider tax rates of host and 
parent countries. While they also find some evidence for profit shifting, their 
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focus is on the pricing and quantity effects of international double taxation as 
reflected in interest margins and FDI of banks.   
Our analysis of profit shifting by multinational banks contributes to this 
literature. We investigate the profit response of multinational banks to taxes. In 
particular, we analyze differences in shifting opportunities across banks due to 
different business models and certain shifting channels like allocation of risky 
assets. Moreover, we consider the impact of tax avoidance legislation, bank 
regulation and the impact associated with the financial crisis.  
For our empirical analysis we use subsidiary-level bank data from the 
international bank database Bankscope in 131 countries over 11 years. 
Identification of multinational profit-shifting activities is a challenging task. In 
accordance with previous literature that has analyzed non-financial firms we 
analyze banks’ tax elasticity of subsidiary profits. While profits of a subsidiary 
are determined by several factors, a systematic impact of tax incentives on 
reported profits can be interpreted as indirect evidence for profit shifting. 
Our results suggest that reported earnings of multinational bank subsidiaries 
significantly respond to host country tax incentives. The magnitude of the tax 
sensitivity of reported profits is almost twice compared with effects found in 
previous studies for MNCs outside the financial sector. Therefore, our results 
suggest that banks have enhanced tax planning opportunities. However, our 
results also show that the tax response of profits is significantly restricted by 
anti-tax avoidance legislation and the financial crisis in 2008 – 2011.  
In a second step we try to identify possible shifting channels. First, we consider 
the tax response of revenues from certain profit components of banks. Our 
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analysis reveals that, in fact, the tax elasticity of profits differs across business 
types. The tax elasticity of revenues generated by interest-bearing activities is 
less responsive compared to other activities. In particular, trading gains are 
highly tax sensitive.    
Second, we focus on the tax influence on potentially important shifting tools. 
Considerable studies have analyzed the discretionary component of loan loss 
provisions (LLPs) used for income smoothing (Greenawalt and Sinkey 1988; 
Beatty et al. 1995; Collins et al. 1995). Nevertheless LLPs value as an indicator 
for future deduction from taxable base has not been at the center of attention 
yet. Making loan loss provisions can reduce taxable income in some countries; 
other jurisdictions do not allow deductions for tax purposes. However, even in 
the case where loan loss provisions are not deductible at the moment, they 
serve as a proxy for the allocation of bad debt in high tax countries. Therefore, 
we expect that LLPs are also tax sensitive. Our results, in fact, suggest 
significant positive effects of host country taxes on the level of loan loss 
provisions. 
Previous tax research has also analyzed capital structure choices in order to 
investigate tax effects on financial decisions (for a survey cf. Feld et al. 2013). 
However, evidence for banks is again scarce. Keen and de Mooij (2012) and de 
Mooij and Heckemeyer (2013) analyze in detail the tax incentives for capital 
structures of banks. They find similar effects compared to the non-financial 
sector. Our analysis of tax influence of capital structure choices confirms 
previous findings of a significant marginal tax effect on capital structures. Yet, 
our results suggest that the magnitude of the tax response via capital structures 
is smaller for multinational banks compared to non-financial firms.     
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We particularly consider how bank regulation and the financial crisis affect the 
response of banks to international tax incentives. We find convincing evidence 
for banks reducing their tax planning during the crisis. Moreover, our results 
suggest that debt financing and loan loss provisioning are affected by banks’ 
capitalization requirements. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a discussion 
of the tax incentives to shift profits is provided. Section 3 explains the 
empirical approach and describes the data. Empirical results are presented in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Profit-Shifting Activities 
In accordance with international tax principles each subsidiary of a 
multinational bank is subject to tax in its country of residence. Taxable profits 
are separately determined for each subsidiary. Therefore, international 
differences in tax rates provide an incentive to adopt strategies that are 
associated with profit shifting from high-taxed to low-taxed subsidiaries. 
Shifting taxable profits into low-tax jurisdictions minimizes the overall bank 
tax payments.  
2.1  Profit Shifting 
Many studies have used an indirect approach to identify profit shifting by 
analyzing a relationship between reported earnings and tax incentives (for a 
review cf. Heckemeyer and Overesch 2013). The scarce existing evidence 
suspects that banks are also engaged in profit shifting (Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Huizinga 2001; Huizinga et al. 2014).  
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We test whether higher host country taxes are associated with less reported 
earnings of bank subsidiaries and attempt to identify shifting channels. While 
profit-shifting activities are often associated with intangible assets and 
manipulation of transfer prices for firm-specific goods, profit-shifting activities 
of banks rely on additional strategies due to their special business model. 
Interest margins, allocation of services and hedging instruments as well as 
disclosure of loan loss provisions are potential candidates. Moreover, interest 
deduction from internal debt financing might be a means to shift profits, 
although capital structure is also a key element of bank regulation.  
Profit-shifting techniques are associated with significant costs of restructuring 
organizational and financial structures. Furthermore, tax legislation also 
restricts the extensive use of shifting techniques by implementing anti-
avoidance regulations. Therefore, shifting aggressive firms suffer the risk that 
transfer prices are adjusted in the course of tax audits. Financial institutions 
have so far not been at the center of transfer-pricing discussions. However the 
OECD Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (2010) 
dedicating a special section to banks’ profit allocation emphasizes the 
importance of this topic for banks.  
Particularly, tax authorities scrutinize intra-group transactions by means of 
transfer-pricing rules. Transfer prices are assessed and adjusted if they do not 
correspond to the arm’s length principle. The key practical issue with applying 
the arm’s length principle is the comparability of intra-group transfer prices 
with prices of transactions between unrelated parties. Identification of 
comparable transactions, however, requires data that is often hard to collect or 
insufficient (see e.g. Durst and Culbertson 2003). Tax authorities have 
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implemented transfer-pricing regulations, but tightness, enforcement and 
documentation obligations of these rules vary across countries. Lohse and 
Riedel (2013) find for MNCs outside the banking sector that additional 
documentation obligations related to transfer pricing can effectively restrict the 
tax response of reported profits. We test whether the tightness of regulation 
affects banks’ transactions accordingly.  
2.2   Effects of Capital Regulation and the Financials Crisis  
An additional constraint banks face is capital regulation. According to the 
Basel III principle, as enforced in most countries, banks must provide certain 
amounts of equity. Therefore capital-tight banks might have differing decision 
incentives. Taking into account banks’ capitalization we are able to test effects 
of regulatory constraints on profit-shifting activities. We expect less tax 
response of capital-tight banks, especially in terms of additional debt financing 
or loan loss provisioning. 
Moreover, our sample period provides insights into banks’ behavioral 
adjustments during the financial crisis. With refinancing becoming increasingly 
difficult we expect banks to face different priorities concerning their earnings. 
Rather than shifting their profits to minimize taxes, we expect a focus on 
maintaining liquidity, fulfilling capital requirements and adjusting their 
business model to changing economic environments. In addition, the public 
debate on aggressive profit maximization and bank bailouts might have 
prevented bank managers from aggressive tax minimization in the aftermath of 
the Lehman shock in 2008. Profit during the crisis should therefore show less 
sensitivity to tax incentives. 
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2.3 Tax Responsiveness of Income from Different Business Models 
Whereas banks may or may not face similar conditions than MNCs concerning 
transfer-pricing strategies, additional tax planning instruments might be 
available. We therefore suspect banks to be able to adjust in various business 
models for tax reasons. Nevertheless, opportunities to allocate taxable revenues 
are likely to differ across banks’ business models. Some business models allow 
transactions being carried out regardless of the distance between banks and 
customers. Moreover, some business models might be more flexible in 
reorganizing their business structures due to the business not requesting plants 
or infrastructure. Most likely we assume to find different tax responses in 
lending activities, trading business as well as net fees and commissions accrual.  
As for interest bearing business, adjusting interest margins in order to accrue 
revenues in low tax jurisdictions is only possible within a certain range. 
Another possibility lies in reallocating lending activity to entities in favorable 
destinations. However, we expect enhanced flexibility for earnings generated 
by consulting and investment banking. Since transactions are much more firm-
specific, the arm’s length principle to assess transfer prices is difficult to apply. 
Within transfer-pricing restrictions, contract design should be able to channel 
some revenue to preferred destinations. We therefore expect pronounced tax 
elasticity for fees and commissions.  
Business activities in multiple countries offer multinational banks possibilities 
to allocate their trading business in tax favorable locations. Previous studies 
focused on the introduction of a securities transaction tax in Sweden. Studies 
find shifts between products and a significant migration of trading volume to 
the UK (Campbell and Froot 1993; Umlauf 1993). More recently Chou and 
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Wang (2006) find similar evidence for trading volume shifted from Singapore 
to Taiwan. In addition there might be some discretion where to realize certain 
gains. We therefore expect trading gains to be rather sensitive to tax 
considerations. So far we only measure the tax effect on profits, well aware 
that the reallocation of business would trigger additional negative effects on 
countries’ tax revenue. 
2.4 Tax Effects on Loan Loss Provisions 
So far, a number of accounting studies have analyzed loan loss provisions 
(LLPs) as a managerial tool in the banking industry. Management incentives 
influencing the discretionary component of LLPs can be grouped in two 
categories. Some studies find evidence that LLPs are used to smooth earnings 
over time. Incentives to smooth income can differ with managers’ strategies. 
Well known examples include so called “big bath” strategies, showing less 
volatility towards investors and managerial self-interest such as earnings based 
compensation packages (Fonseca and González 2008; Balboa et al. 2013). A 
second group of studies finds capital management to be a driver of loan loss 
provisioning, as LLPs can be partly used to fulfill capital requirements 
 
(Beatty 
et al. 1995; Ahmed et al. 1999; Laeven and Majnoni 2003).  
Huizinga et al. (2014) suspect some profit shifting to be done via loan loss 
provisioning. However, the potential tax response of LLPs has not been 
analyzed empirically. Tax treatment for loan loss provisions varies among 
countries. Whereas some jurisdictions, such as the United States do not allow 
taxable deduction, other jurisdictions, for example Japan, France and Germany 
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allow deduction under specific conditions.
21
 Covering 138 countries, we are 
unable to account for every specific regulation in our analysis.
 22
 However, all 
countries have in common, that a deduction for tax purposes is possible in case 
the debt becomes default. Therefore, we assume a strong incentive to place 
high risk debt in high-tax jurisdictions. We take the amount of loan loss 
provisions as proxy for banks’ attempt to allocate loans with a high default risk 
in locations with a high statutory tax rate.    
Given the existence of suitable subsidiaries, we will test whether banks 
disclose additional loan loss provisions in high tax jurisdictions to benefit from 
tax deductibility.  
2.5 Tax Effects in Capital Structures 
Whether and to what extent taxes affect financing decisions of firms has been 
subject to extensive discussion in the literature. Theoretical models suggest that 
firms optimize their capital structures by considering a trade-off between costs 
and benefits of debt financing. The costs may be related to financial distress 
(see Kraus and Litzenberger 1973), or in case of banks to regulatory 
requirements (Merton 1978; Marcus 1984). Moreover costs may arise from 
agency conflicts between equity and debt claimants on the one hand (see 
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977), or between managers and 
shareholders on the other hand (Jensen 1986; Lundstrum 2003). Leland (1994) 
                                                          
21
 LLPs are regulated by IAS No. 39 and therefore subject to the incurred loss model. This 
requires that a loss event occurs before a provision can be made and was introduced to avoid 
so-called ‘big bath’ general provisions that distorted the accurate reporting of financial 
performance to investors. Bankscope’s data item “Loan loss provisions” includes general and 
specific provisions for bad debt.  In the case of Germany, this equals general and specific 
deductions made under § 253 III HGB (German local GAAP), which are mostly tax deductible. 
Additional reserves under §340f HGB are reported under a different item and are not tax 
deductible 
22
 For an overview of loan loss provisions see World Bank (2003).  
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and Harding et al. (2013) add to the discussion by differentiating between 
protected and unprotected debt to explain banks’ behavior in a realistic 
framework. 
The major tax benefit of debt financing is that interest expenses are deductible 
from corporate profits, while dividend payments to equity holders are not. 
Hence, debt can act as a tax shield since taxable profits are reduced.  The value 
of this tax shield obviously depends on several conditions: the corporate tax 
rate of the borrowing entity and the tax treatment of interest income 
(Modigliani and Miller 1963).The higher the corporate tax rate, the higher the 
value of the debt tax shield. However a high tax rate on interest income for the 
investors could limit or even rule out the effect (Miller 1977).  
Regarding international tax incentives within multinational firms, a large body 
of literature provides striking evidence of profit shifting by intercompany debt 
for MNCs (Desai et al. 2004; Huizinga et al. 2008; for a survey Feld et al. 
2013).Yet, evidence on the tax impact on capital structures of banks is still 
scarce.  
Previous research identifies unexpected similarities between capital structures 
of financial institutions and non-financial multinationals (Gropp and Heider 
2010), but at the same time identifies bank specific factors in capital structure 
choice (Miles et al. 2012). Accordingly we expect similar tax planning 
activities as observed for non-financial multinationals, but also expect unique 
results due to banks’ specific regulatory framework.  
Taking a closer look at banks’ capital structure we face ambiguous 
argumentation on banks responsiveness to tax. While the same tax incentives 
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apply to banks than to MNCs, banks are subject to regulation in most countries. 
Common argumentation stresses that regulation alone determines banks’ 
capital structure and therefore little responsiveness to taxation is to be 
expected. Merton (1978) and Marcus (1984) provide theoretical support for 
this argument. Both argue that a higher level of regulation results in higher 
equity ratios for banks. Keen and de Mooij (2012), Gropp and Heider (2010) 
and Harding et al. (2009) find large variation in banks’ capital ratios, and in 
contrast to common textbook prediction, that banks on average hold more 
equity than required by regulation.  
We therefore expect banks in general to be tax sensitive but control in our 
regression for capital constraint banks to eliminate banks unable to adjust their 
capital structure. Moreover the availability of tax planning through ‘hybrid’ 
instruments that are categorized differently for tax and regulatory purposes 
might help to be sensitive to tax considerations, too. We expect a positive sign 
for the marginal tax effect because additional debt financing is associated with 
deductible interest payments and thus, less taxable profits of the respective 
subsidiary.  
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1  Empirical Approach 
In our empirical analysis of profit-shifting behavior in the banking industry, we 
analyze subsidiary-level data of multinational banks. Although previous studies 
have investigated profit-shifting activities of non-financial MNCs only, we can 
refer to these well-known empirical identification strategies.  
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Regarding the general profit-shifting evidence, previous studies have analyzed 
a response of reported profitability of a subsidiary to tax incentive. The idea is 
that reported pre-tax profits 𝑃𝑖
𝑟  of subsidiary i are equal to the sum of 
unobserved true pre-tax profits and those profits shifted into or out of this 
country.  
Unobserved true profits generated at a certain location can be described by 
some production function. Therefore, the common specification in previous 
literature considers a vector X including several factors influencing true 
economic profits like capital employed, wages or host country characteristics.  
The scale of profit shifting should depend on the level of host country taxes. 
Then, the most common estimation equation in literature is obtained:  
 ln 𝑃𝑖
𝑟 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝜏𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖                        (1) 
A negative sign for 𝛾 is expected if profits are shifted into other locations when 
the local tax rate is rising. Due to the log-level specification, the coefficient 𝛾 is 
a tax semi-elasticity of reported profits. Moreover, we control for heterogeneity 
across banks by a bank-specific effect 𝛿𝑖. 𝑣𝑖 is a random term. 
In an additional analysis we will consider different profit measures including 
only revenues from certain business models of banks. This additional analysis 
can detect potential asymmetries in the response to taxes between business 
models. Moreover, we follow up on loan loss provisioning and debt allocation 
as potentially important profit-shifting techniques. Since both measures are 
associated with less taxable profits, we expect positive effects of host country 
taxes. 
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3.2  Bank Data 
We obtain comprehensive bank data from all over the world from Bankscope 
Database compiled by Bureau Van Dijk. The database provides balance sheets 
and income statements for banks based on annual reports, as well as 
information on their worldwide affiliates.  
For our study, we use a dataset on multinational banks from 2001 to 2012. 
Accordingly, we consider only bank groups with at least one subsidiary in a 
foreign country. We consider a subsidiary if at least 50 percent of its shares are 
owned by the respective parent bank. Moreover, we eliminate Central Banks, 
Specialized Governmental Credit Institution and Micro-Finance Institutions 
from our sample, as their incentives might differ largely from other banks. 
Banks with a negative equity value are also eliminated. The sample selection 
limits our sample to 2,136 multinational bank groups located in 131 countries 
across the world. Table 3.1 depicts the sample selection. 
TABLE 3.1: Sample Selection 
Bank groups listed in Bankscope database 2001-2012 3,221 
Exclusion of Central banks, Specialized Governmental Credit 
Institution and Micro-Finance Institutions 
- 35 
Exclusion of banks with no sufficient tax information - 91 
Exclusion of banks with negative equity - 4 
Exclusion of banks with no sufficient balance sheet information  - 959 
Final sample of bank groups 2,136 
 
Since each subsidiary is subject to tax in the respective host country, the 
empirical analysis considers unconsolidated accounts of both parent firms and 
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subsidiaries; consolidated accounts are removed.
23
 Accordingly, the data reflect 
responsiveness on national tax rates and country-specific regulations. 
Unfortunately financial data of subsidiaries are only available if the subsidiary 
is also a bank. This leaves us with a sample of 18,929 bank-year observations. 
3.3 Bank-Level Variables  
In our basic set of estimations, we use earnings before taxes (EBT, in logs) of 
each subsidiary as our dependent variable.
24
 To test differences in the tax 
response across different business models, we also use Net interest revenue and 
Non-interest operating income as well as Trading gains and revenue from Net 
fees and commissions as additional dependent variables. In additional analyses 
we also refer to loan loss provisions (LLPs)
25
 and the total debt-to-total assets 
ratio (LEVERAGE).  
We control for several bank characteristics. First of all, we consider proxies for 
the size of economic activities as determinants of subsidiaries’ ‘true’ economic 
profit in the absence of profit-shifting incentives. We include banks’ total 
assets (TA) and capture banks’ activities that are not included in the balance 
sheet by off-balance sheet items (OBS). The ratio of earning assets to total 
assets (EA) captures the bank’s share of assets that generate interest or 
dividend income. Moreover, we use total personnel expenses (PAYROLL) as 
an additional proxy for the scale of affiliate production. Furthermore, we 
                                                          
23
 Banks are known to use permanent establishments (PE) due to various non-tax reasons such 
as bank licensing. Unfortunately, balance sheet data does not allow detecting profits allocated 
to a foreign PE. We therefore must assume that our analysis captures not the full extent of 
banks´ tax planning activities and can therefore be seen as the lower bound of banks´ profit 
shifting. 
24
 Tests with EBT divided by total assets produced similar results. 
25
 The variable LLP measures the total amount of loan loss provisions accrued at the respective 
subsidiary and year. 
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consider subsidiary growth (GROWTH) measured as the annual change in total 
assets.  
Our definition of COLLATERAL follows Gropp and Heider (2010) and 
includes total securities, treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, cash and due 
from banks, land and buildings and other tangible assets divided by the book 
value of assets to allow for banks’ specific asset structure.  Profitability is 
captured by adjusting net income with interest expenses/total assets 
(ADJROA). We expect a negative sign because high profits could lead banks 
to retain earnings and lower their leverage ratio. Additionally we use pre-
impairment operating profits (PIOP) to control for profitability before loan loss 
provisioning.  
3.4 Tax Variables and Additional Controls 
Regarding tax incentives to shift taxable profits within the multinational bank, 
we consider the statutory corporate tax rate (STR) of the subsidiary’s host 
country. The statutory corporate tax rate includes state taxes as well as local 
surcharges. This can be challenging for federal countries like the US, where 
states apply different tax regimes. For this reason we use an average tax rate 
for countries with a federal structure. In our sample: Canada, Germany, 
Switzerland  and the US. To support our results we conduct additional analyses 
for all our specifications using the corporate tax rate of the respective financial 
centers, e.g. Toronto, Frankfurt, Zurich and New York City. 
While studies typically focus on tax incentives arising from host country tax 
rates, they neglect that the shifted profit amount is subject to tax at the level of 
the receiving entity within the same firm. The relevant tax incentive is 
67 
 
determined by the tax-rate differential between the two subsidiaries. As a 
notable exception Huizinga and Laeven (2008) analyze profit shifting of MNCs 
and consider weighted tax rates with weights depending on the observed assets 
of the other foreign affiliates belonging to the same firm to account for tax 
incentives arising within the multinational firm.
26
 
Therefore, we consider several tax measures to approximate the international 
profit-shifting incentive of multinational banks. WATR is the average tax rate 
within the multinational banking group, excluding the tax rate of the affiliate in 
question. Please note that we consider the total universe of bank subsidiaries 
documented in Bankscope. That means for the construction of the mean tax 
rate we also consider subsidiaries without full financial data. By adding the 
WATR we expand our analysis from banks own tax incentives to incentives 
within the group structure. We expect positive coefficients since banks would 
be encouraged to keep profits domestic or even shift profits away from higher 
taxed jurisdictions.  
To further explore the components of the tax incentive we use MINSTR, the 
minimum tax rate found within the group. Here again we expect a positive 
coefficient, since a higher minimum tax rate indicates a lower incentive to shift 
profits. 
The indicator (TP) considers a country’s strictness and enforcement of transfer-
pricing rules. The data is provided by Lohse et al. (2012). In practice 
difficulties in compliance with transfer-pricing regulation might differ among 
industries. While manufacturing firms aim to allocate their personnel most 
                                                          
26
 See also Buettner and Wamser (2012) using the tax rate differential between the local tax 
rate and the minimum tax rate observed within the company to investigate internal borrowing.  
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efficiently to exploit transfer prices, banks’ focus is set on risk allocation. 
However, as our index is based on general conditions such as documentation, 
enforcement and disclosure requirements, we are confident it can be applied to 
the financial industry. We use a dummy variable which equals one for strict 
and zero for rather loose transfer-pricing regulation.
27
 
Regarding capital regulation of banks, we control for capital-tight banks. CAP 
is a dummy variable equaling one for firms with limited capitalization and zero 
otherwise. Since BANKSCOPE does not provide sufficient information to 
compute precise risk-adjusted capital thresholds, we therefore define the 25%-
percentile of banks with the lowest capitalization ratio as capital tight. In our 
sample the threshold equals banks with a capitalization of 12.4 % and less.  
We expect banks to be less responsive to tax effects after 2008 due to ongoing 
recapitalization difficulties throughout the industry. We include a Crisis 
dummy to separate effects before and after the Lehman shock. Our dummy 
equals 1 for the years 2008-2011. Due to our international sample we control 
for inflation (INF) as the annual percentage change in Consumer Price index of 
the subsidiary’s host country. Dyreng at al. (2012) emphasize the influence of 
the level of rule of law (RULEOFLAW) on subsidiaries’ earnings management. 
Our control variable RULEOFLAW is taken from the World Bank 
Development Indicators dataset. Scores are reported between -2,5 and +2,5 on 
a country-year level. The score measures the perception of the extent to which 
rules of society are respected, particularly the quality of contract enforcement. 
A high score indicates a strong rule of law. 
                                                          
27
 We classify transfer pricing rules as strict if the original score according to Lohse and Riedel 
(2013) is four or five. Transfer pricing rules are considered as loose if original scores range 
between zero and three.   
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TABLE 3.2: Summary Statistics 
 No. of 
obs. 
Mean Std. dev Min Max 
EBT  18929 35,009.03 46,34529.1 .001 1.87e+07 
Net interest revenue  20944 55,216.98 749,227.3 .002 3.39e+07 
Non-interest operating 
income 
20355 24,718.21 343,451.6 .001 1.53e+07 
Net fees and commissions  18929 12,227.1 147,617.1 .001 4,972,000 
Net Gains on Trading  5907 8,499.542 67,784.94 .001 2,123,000 
LLPs 16208 13,917.28 186,555.4 .001 7,879,000 
LEVERAGE 18929 .896 .10 0 .99 
TA  18929 1,775,897 1.97e+07       .021 7.01e+08 
EA 18929 1,517,333 1.65e+07 0 5.67e+08 
OBS  18929 381,334.6 5,533019 .001 3.35e+08 
PAYROLL  18929 19,518.27 254,386.3 .001 1.02e+07 
ADJROA 18810 .038 .036 -0.0816 .854 
PIOP 16208 50,763.04 62,9126.8 -53.0000 2.34e+07 
GROWTH 18929 .0115 .030 -.31 .799 
COLLATERAL 18929 .261 .171 0 1 
STR 18929 .32 .083 0 .55 
STRFIN 18929 .34   .097 0 .55 
MIN STR 18929 .25 .13 0 .55 
WATR 18929 .314 .063 0 .55 
RULEOFLAW 18929 1.09 .86 -1.68 1.99 
INF  18929 3.13 3.55 .037 152.56 
TP 15270 .31 .46 0 1 
CAP 18929 .12 .336 0 1 
Sources: Bank variables are derived from Bankscope provided by Bureau van Dijk. The tax variables are 
derived from information taken from the IBFD Tax Handbooks and the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides 
by Ernst & Young. The Transfer pricing indicator is taken from Lohse et al. (2012). Inflation Rate and 
RULEOFLAW stem from the World Bank’s Development Indicators, edition 2012.  
 
4. Results  
In this section, we present the regression results for the tax impact on reported 
profits of subsidiaries in the banking sector.   
4.1 Tax Effects on Reported Profits 
We start with an analysis of reported profits with results shown in Table 3.3. 
The dependent variable is (log) EBT. Regressions follow Equation (1) as 
described in Section 3. Some of the tax variables which are important for our 
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identification only vary within country-year cells. Moulton (1990) and 
Bertrand et al. (2004) show that the presence of a common random effect at the 
country-year level has to be taken into account. Thus, we use a variance-
covariance matrix allowing for random group effects by clustering in country-
year cells. We consider parent-specific effects to control for the heterogeneity 
among bank groups. Moreover, we consider a full set of year effects and bank 
type effects which capture differences in the financial conditions among 15 
different bank types shown in our sample.  
All specifications consider a basic set of control variables to explain true 
economic profits generated by subsidiaries in the absence of any profit shifting. 
In particular, we can confirm that the stock of invested capital and payroll exert 
significant positive effects on the profit amount.  Furthermore, we also find a 
positive influence of the off-balance sheet items. Moreover, higher inflation in 
a host country is associated with significantly higher reported profit.  
Regarding the tax incentive, we find a negative and highly significant effect of 
the host country tax rate on reported profits. Subsidiaries with higher host 
country tax levels have significantly smaller pre-tax profits. This finding 
confirms the expectation that reported profits of multinational banks respond to 
host country taxes. Considering Column (1) of Table 3.3, the coefficient of -
2.378 suggests that a one percentage point higher host country tax rate is 
associated with about 2.4 percent less reported profits of a bank subsidiary.    
Compared with results from studies that consider data from non-financial 
MNCs, the semi-elasticity of -2.378 is large in absolute terms. A recent meta-
study of 25 previous studies by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) suggests as a 
consensus estimate a tax semi-elasticity of subsidiary profits of about -0.8 for 
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non-financial MNCs. Banks seem to be more flexible in terms of shifting their 
profits compared to the non-banking sector.  
In Column (2) we add the subsidiary’s leverage as control variable. By doing 
so, we control for debt shifting as one potentially important shifting 
mechanism. As expected, the estimated tax effect is smaller in the presence of 
a control for differences in debt share. However, the remaining tax effect is still 
significant and of a noticeable magnitude. We conclude that debt financing 
might not be the most important profit-shifting mechanism within 
multinational banks. We will come back to this issue in an additional analysis 
in Section 4.4. 
The host country tax rate might not reflect the complete tax incentive to use 
profit-shifting opportunities. In Column (3) and (4) we include an average tax 
rate of all other locations of the multinational banking group and the minimum 
tax rate available within the group. Since the average tax rate and the available 
minimum tax rate proxy for the tax effectively imposed if profits are shifted 
within the multinational group, an adverse effect on the remaining profits of a 
subsidiary is expected. A higher tax level at other locations of the multinational 
bank diminishes the incentive to shift profits. As expected both control 
variables show are significantly positive effect, indicating less profit shifting if 
the tax level in other jurisdiction increases.  
Following Dyreng et al. (2012)’s evidence for non-financial MNCs we expect 
less profit shifting in countries with a high level of RULEOFLAW. However, 
even though our coefficient is small, it implicates more profit shifting in 
countries with a high score. 
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Regarding restrictions of profit shifting, we account for the level of transfer-
pricing regulation and enforcement in host countries. The positive effect of the 
interaction term between the tax rate and the transfer-pricing indicator in 
Column (6) provides evidence that stricter transfer-pricing regulation is 
associated with an adverse effect on the profit response to taxes. Taking into 
account the point estimates for the plain tax rate and the interaction term with 
the transfer-pricing indicator, our findings suggest that the tax response of bank 
profits is completely eliminated by strict transfer-pricing regulation. 
  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.3:  Banks’ Profit Shifting  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
STR -2.378*** -2.064*** -2.999*** -2.753*** -2.008*** -3.200*** -2.432*** -2.539*** 
 (0.249) (0.243) (0.285) (0.247) (0.241) (0.263) (0.249) (0.249) 
TA(ln) 0.680*** 0.783*** 0.680*** 0.680*** 0.694*** 0.694*** 0.681*** 0.683*** 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) 
EA 0.341** 0.410*** 0.393*** 0.381*** 0.417*** 0.251 0.359** 0.316** 
 (0.144) (0.132) (0.145) (0.145) (0.143) (0.174) (0.144) (0.144) 
OBS (ln) 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
PAYROLL (ln) 0.252*** 0.190*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.214*** 0.223*** 0.250*** 0.250*** 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) 
GROWTH -0.832*** -0.371 -0.831*** -0.818*** -0.997*** -1.106*** -0.824*** -0.892*** 
 (0.262) (0.268) (0.263) (0.261) (0.255) (0.284) (0.261) (0.261) 
COLLATERAL 0.439*** 0.193*** 0.440*** 0.440*** 0.405*** 0.216** 0.434*** 0.443*** 
 (0.084) (0.074) (0.084) (0.083) (0.081) (0.098) (0.084) (0.084) 
INF (ln) 0.095*** 0.077*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.038* 0.067** 0.095*** 0.102*** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026) (0.022) (0.021) 
LEVERAGE  -3.514***       
  (0.145)       
WATR   2.321***      
   (0.815)      
MINSTR    1.307***     
    (0.494)     
RULEOFLAW     -0.276***    
     (0.030)    
TP      -0.729***   
      (0.200)   
TP x STR      3.729***   
      (0.687)   
CAP       -0.176  
        (0.129)  
CAP x STR       0.379  
       (0.426)  
CRISIS x STR        0.941*** 
        (0.345) 
R2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
N 18,929 18,929 18,929 18,929 18,929 15,270 18,929 18,929 
Notes: The dependent variable is earnings before taxes EBT (ln). Explanatory variables: STR is the statutory corporate tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country. TA (ln) are total assets and OBS (ln) 
measures off-balance sheet items. EA are earning assets over total assets. PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel expense. GROWTH is the change of total assets. COLLATERAL is a tangibility measure 
following Gropp and Heider (2010) including total securities, treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, cash and due from banks, land and buildings and other tangible assets divided by the book value of 
assets to allow for banks’ specific asset structure. WATR is the worldwide average tax rate within the group. Inflation as the annual percentage in Consumer Price index of the subsidiary’s host country 
as reported by the World Bank Database. LEVERAGE is the total debt-to-total assets ratio. RULEOFLAW is an indicator for the host country’s level of rule of law, scores are taken from the World 
Bank Development Indicators dataset. TP is a dummy variable for the strictness of transfer pricing regulation. CAP is a dummy variable for banks’ limited capitalization. CRISIS is an indicator for 
years before and after the financial crisis. Year dummies, bank-type effects and parent-firm effects are included but not reported. Robust standard errors, clustered on a country-year level, are shown in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
74 
 
4.2 Effects of Bank Regulation and the Financial Crisis 
In additional regressions in Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3.3, we test whether 
bank regulation and the financial crisis affect profit-shifting behavior of 
multinational banks. In Column (7) we consider an indicator for banks’ actual 
capitalization. A value of one indicates that the respective bank is in the lower 
25%-percentile concerning total capital ratio. Although our coefficient is negative, 
indicating capital-tight banks being unable to shift profits, our results are 
statistically insignificant. We cannot conclude that bank regulation does affect the 
responsiveness of total profit to tax incentives.   
Considering that our panel includes the financial crisis as a period with exceptional 
challenges for banks, we included a dummy for years between 2008 and 2011 in 
Column (8). Our results suggest that banks did less profit shifting during the 
financial crisis. This coincides with the general assumption that banks had other 
preferences in their behavior during the crisis. Buch et al. 2013 state that the crisis 
lowered banks’ engagement in international assets. Withdrawal from foreign 
markets can be associated with less tax planning possibilities. Nevertheless, the 
strong impact of the financial crisis on balance sheets calls for follow-up research 
on this topic. 
An additional set of regressions using the statutory tax rate of the respective 
financial centers supports our results (see Appendix, table 3.7). 
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4.3 Income from different business models 
In our first analysis in Table 3.3, we referred to EBT as our profit measure. By 
choosing this rather broad measure, we capture the overall response to taxes. In 
order to corroborate our main results we conduct a series of additional tests. 
Regressions in Table 3.4 focus on potential differences in the tax response of 
profits generated by different business models of multinational banks.   
We take specification (1) from Table 3.3 as a starting point but choose different 
profit measures as dependent variables. Column (1) of Table 3.4 considers Net 
interest revenue as dependent variable. In Column (2) of Table 3.4 we focus on the 
non-interest revenues. The significant negative coefficients in both specifications 
support our assumption that revenues are allocated to low tax subsidiaries. 
However, comparing the point estimates for the tax response, revenues from 
interest bearing business are less flexible with regard to profit shifting. Our results 
suggest that revenues from other types of business are particularly mobile. 
Columns (3) and (4) provide additional insights into this tax response and take into 
account certain types of non-interest income. We consider Trading gains as well 
as Net fees and commissions as dependent variables. The results again support the 
view that different business types are asymmetrically responsive to tax incentives. 
Comparing our results we find a rather large semi-elasticity for Trading gains 
compared to Net fees and commissions or Net interest revenue.
28
 The findings 
suggest that Trading gains are particularly mobile and shifting to low tax 
                                                          
28
 To consider potential sample biases we also tested all specifications with the smaller sample used 
in the Trading gains regression and gained similar results. 
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subsidiaries seems to be rather easy. However taking into account the absolute size 
of business models, Net interest revenue proofs to be still an important channel. 
Due to banks’ unique business model Net interest revenue has a high volume and 
contains a variety of transactions. Although the measured tax semi-elasticity is 
rather small, the absolute amount of shifted income is still larger for interest 
bearing business than the shifting amount due to tax-optimal allocation of trading 
gains.  
Coefficients for our control variable support the validity of our results. More 
earning assets can be associated with an increase in Net interest revenue. A 
contrasting relationship can be reported for on Non-interest operating income and 
Net fees and commissions. This is expected because a higher share in earning 
assets indicates a banks focus on interest-generating activities as opposed to fee-
generating activities.   
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 TABLE 3.4: Income from Different Business Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Net interest 
revenue 
Non-interest 
operating 
income 
Trading 
gains 
 
Net fees and 
commissions 
STR -0.551*** -0.820*** -3.401*** -0.719*** 
 (0.139) (0.190) (0.463) (0.173) 
TA (ln) 0.631*** 0.260*** 0.592*** 0.175*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.051) (0.019) 
EA 0.408*** -0.603*** 0.018 -0.278*** 
 (0.105) (0.100) (0.324) (0.107) 
OBS (ln) 0.005 0.024*** -0.025 0.036*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.023) (0.008) 
PAYROLL (ln) 0.366*** 0.708*** 0.379*** 0.751*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.049) (0.017) 
GROWTH -1.072*** -0.500*** 0.109 -0.182 
 (0.169) (0.162) (0.633) (0.177) 
COLLATERAL 0.047 -0.067 1.023*** -0.450*** 
 (0.055) (0.062) (0.218) (0.052) 
INF (ln) 0.103*** 0.030 0.154*** -0.016 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.043) (0.014) 
R
2
 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.97 
N 20,944 20,355 5,907 18,929 
Notes: Dependent variables: (1) Net interest revenue (ln); (2) Non-interest operating income (ln); (3) Trading 
gains (ln); (4) Net fees and commissions (ln).  Explanatory variables: STR is the statutory corporate tax rate of 
the subsidiary’s host country. TA is total assets TA and OBS (ln) measures off-balance sheet items. EA are 
earning assets over total assets. PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel expense. PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel 
expense. GROWTH is the change of total assets. COLLATERAL is a tangibility measure following Gropp 
and Heider (2010) including total securities, treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, cash and due from banks, 
land and buildings and other tangible assets divided by the book value of assets to allow for banks’ specific 
asset structure. INF is inflation as the annual percentage in Consumer Price index of the subsidiary’s host 
country as reported by the World Bank Database. Year dummies, bank type effects and parent-firm effects are 
included but not reported. Robust standard errors, clustered on a country-year level, are shown in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
4.4 Loan Loss Provisions  
The literature suggests that loan loss provisioning is an item with a discretionary 
component depending to some extent on decision makers’ strategies. We therefore 
investigate the relationship between LLPs and the statutory tax rate within the 
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multinational bank. We expect a positive correlation between STR and the amount 
of LLPs, equaling less taxable income in high-tax jurisdictions.
 29
   
TABLE 3.5: Loan Loss Provisions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
STR 2.330*** 2.834*** 2.922*** 3.242*** 
 (0.434) (0.436) (0.425) (0.414) 
TA (ln) 0.497*** 0.287*** 0.290*** 0.279*** 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
EA -0.683*** -0.754*** -0.778*** -0.717*** 
 (0.205) (0.215) (0.216) (0.216) 
OBS (ln) 0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
PAYROLL (ln) 0.444*** 0.329*** 0.328*** 0.332*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
GROWTH -2.758*** -2.308*** -2.306*** -2.082*** 
 (0.446) (0.462) (0.463) (0.454) 
COLLATERAL -0.769*** -0.832*** -0.832*** -0.842*** 
 (0.115) (0.117) (0.118) (0.117) 
INF (ln) 0.142*** 0.096*** 0.094*** 0.080*** 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) 
PIOP (ln)  0.350*** 0.350*** 0.351*** 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
CAP   0.664***  
    (0.175)  
CAP x STR   -2.118***  
   (0.566)  
CRISIS x STR    -1.931*** 
    (0.582) 
R
2
 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 
N 16,208 15,592 15,592 15,592 
Notes: Dependent variable is loan loss provisions LLP (ln). Explanatory variables: STR is the statutory 
corporate tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country. TA (ln) are total assets and OBS (ln) measures off-balance 
sheet items. EA are earning assets over total assets. PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel expense. PAYROLL 
(ln) is total personnel expense. GROWTH is the change of total assets. COLLATERAL is a tangibility 
measure following Gropp and Heider (2010) including total securities, treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, 
cash and due from banks, land and buildings and other tangible assets divided by the book value of assets to 
allow for banks’ specific asset structure. INF is inflation as the annual percentage in Consumer Price index of 
the subsidiary’s host country as reported by the World Bank Database. PIOP (ln) is pre-impairment operating 
profit. CAP is a dummy variable for banks’ limited capitalization. CRISIS is an indicator for years before and 
after the financial crisis. Year dummies, bank-type effects and parent-firm effects are included but not 
reported. Robust standard errors, clustered on a country-year level, are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
We find a significant positive tax effect on LLPs for all specifications in Table 
3.5.
30
 Column (1) indicates an increase in LLPs of 2.3 percent for a one percentage 
                                                          
29
 For an overview cf. World Bank (2002). 
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point higher host-country tax rate. To isolate the tax effect we consider controls for 
banks’ profitability and capitalization. In accordance with findings in the 
accounting literature we find a positive impact of pre-impairment operating profits 
(PIOP) with loan loss provisioning. Banks with a higher PIOP might buildup LLPs 
for future losses as well as a means to reduce their tax base.  
As accounting literature is suggesting we expect capital-tight banks to be less 
interested in income smoothing. Additional LLPs might not contribute to 
regulatory (Tier I) capital but decrease the possibility to retain earnings. Since high 
leverage and capital tightness come usually as a result of low earnings or losses in 
previous periods, it can be argued that banks in a tough financial situation would 
rather increase their earnings than engage in aggressive tax planning. Column (3) 
supports our prediction. The interaction term between the indicator variable for 
capital-tight banks and the tax rate is negative and statistically significant.  
In column (4), we again investigate the effect of the financial crisis. As expected, 
we find evidence that LLPs are buildup during the crisis years. Considering the 
two coefficients of the plain tax variable and the interaction term, our finding 
suggests almost no tax effect on LLPs during the financial crisis. The economic 
situation during the crisis seems to mitigate the discretionary component of LLPs.  
Interestingly earning assets (EA) show significantly negative coefficients 
throughout all our specifications. This could be attributed to banks with a high 
share in earning assets are on average less risky. 
                                                                                                                                                                
30
 To test for robustness we conduct additional regressions using the difference between PIOP and 
Operating Profit. The results support our findings and are available upon request.   
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In additional tests we are able to support our results. The United States are 
particularly known for not allowing a tax deduction of LLPs. Therefore we 
simulate a zero incentive by replacing the statutory tax rate with zero for the 
United States (see Appendix, Table 3.11). In addition we test for a subsample, 
excluding the United States (see Appendix, Table 3.12). Both analyses are in 
accordance with our previous result and find a significant positive effect. 
4.5 Capital Structure 
In additional analyses we trace refinancing through internal and external capital 
markets as an additional shifting mechanism. More precisely, we analyze tax 
effects on capital structures of bank subsidiaries. We employ LEVERAGE as our 
dependent variable in our regression analysis. The additional regression results are 
depicted in Table 3.6.  
Our selection of control variables follows seminal studies providing capital 
structure regressions (Frank and Goyal 2009; Gropp and Heider 2010; Keen and 
de Mooij 2012). Frank and Goyal (2009) identify a core set of six capital structure 
determinants including controls for firm size, tangibility, profit, inflation, firm-
specific growth options, and industry median leverage.
31
  
Estimated effects for the non-tax determinants are in accordance with previous 
research. TA and OBS allow us to control for size effects. As expected our data 
confirms that larger banks measured by total assets have higher leverage ratios, 
possibly due to their lower default risk and therefore easier borrowing access 
                                                          
31
 Note that we control for the industry median by including fixed effects for bank types. 
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(Rajan and Zingales 1995; Graham and Harvey 2001).
 
 EA allow us to control for 
banks’ share of interest generating activities. A higher share indicates less risky 
activities and can therefore be associated with borrowing conditions. 
More profitable subsidiaries use less debt. Profitability is captured by adjusting net 
income with interest expenses/total assets (ADJROA). Profitability is negatively 
related to debt financing suggesting that profitable firms demand less external 
funds to finance new investment projects (Titman and Wessels 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales 1995). Moreover, high profits could lead banks to retain earnings and 
lower their leverage ratio.  
Additionally, we consider firm growth. Expectations depend on how subsidiaries 
finance new investments: if firms can finance investments by retained earnings, 
the effect of growth on total debt may be negative; if new investments are financed 
with debt, the effect might be positive. Across all specifications we find an 
insignificant effect. 
Interestingly, additional COLLATERAL leads to smaller leverage. Collateral 
reduces the cost of external lending. In addition, banks with high tangibility are 
expected to have easier access and lower costs of borrowing since they can use 
these assets as collateral when borrowing from central banks. However, studies 
analyzing capital-structure choices of multinational subsidiaries suggest that 
MNCs use internal capital markets (cf. Desai et al. 2004; de Haas and van 
Lelyveld 2010). If internal borrowing is a substitute for external debt, the effect of 
collateral on the total leverage might also be negative. 
  
82 
 
Across all specifications in Table 3.6, we find a significant positive effect of the 
host country tax rate on leverage. Accordingly, our results confirm the expectation 
of additional debt financing if interest deductibility avoids higher taxes. The 
coefficient for the tax rate of 0.073 in column (1) of Table 3.6 means that the debt-
to-asset ratio of a subsidiary falls by about 0.1 percentage point if the local tax rate 
increases by one percentage point. 
The magnitude of our marginal tax effect is however small in comparison with 
marginal tax effects on capital structures found for non-financial MNCs. In a 
meta-analysis covering 48 studies on the relationship between corporate capital 
structure and taxation, Feld et al. (2013) predict the debt-to-assets ratio to increase 
by 0.27 percentage points if the applicable corporate tax rate increases by one 
percentage point. We conclude that capital structures of multinational banks are 
less sensitive to tax incentives. Our overall results are smaller but nevertheless 
qualitatively consistent with previous results by Keen and de Mooij (2012) and de 
Mooij and Heckemeyer (2013). Moreover, de Mooij and Heckemeyer (2013) also 
find that the tax elasticity of banks’ capital structures falls with increasing bank 
size. For obvious reasons, multinational banks belong to the biggest banks. 
One potential reason for the small marginal tax effect on banks’ capital structures 
might be the fact that banks are in general already highly leveraged, in our sample 
89% on average. Therefore, capital structure adjustments might be smaller in 
absolute terms. As a second restriction almost all countries impose regulatory 
measures on banks and therefore limit responsiveness. To take this expectation 
into account, in column (2) we again add the dummy variable indicating capital-
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tight banks. Our results support the expectation that banks close to their regulatory 
minimum capital requirement do respond less to tax incentives.  
TABLE 3.6: Taxes and Bank Capital Structure  
 (1) (2) (3) 
STR 0.073*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
TA(ln) 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EA 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.058*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
OBS (ln) -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ADJROA -0.069* -0.065* -0.069* 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
GROWTH 0.088 0.088 0.089 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
COLLATERAL -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.088*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
INF (ln) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CAP  0.032***  
  (0.009)  
CAP x STR  -0.040  
  (0.026)  
CRISIS x STR   -0.034 
   (0.022) 
R
2
 0.71 0.71 0.71 
N 22,273 22,273 22,273 
Notes: Dependent variable is the total debt-to-total asset ratio. Explanatory variables: STR is the statutory 
corporate tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country. TA (ln) are total assets and OBS (ln) measures off-balance 
sheet items. EA are earning assets over total assets. PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel expense.. ADJROA is a 
profitability measure captured by net income and interest expenses over total assets. GROWTH is the change 
of total assets. COLLATERAL is a tangibility measure following Gropp and Heider (2010) including total 
securities, treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, cash and due from banks, land and buildings and other 
tangible assets divided by the book value of assets to allow for banks’ specific asset structure. INF is inflation 
as the annual percentage in Consumer Price index of the subsidiary’s host country as reported by the World 
Bank Database. CAP is a dummy variable for banks’ limited capitalization. CRISIS is an indicator for years 
before and after the financial crisis. Year dummies, bank type effects and parent-firm effects are included but 
not reported. Robust standard errors, clustered on a country-year level, are shown in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
In specification (3) we take into account that in the aftermath of the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, financial markets struggled and financing of 
banks became an extremely difficult task. We test whether during the crisis the 
focus was no longer on tax planning.  The negative effect of the interaction term 
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between CRISIS and STR suggests that banks’ response to tax incentives 
decreased due to the financial crisis. However the effect is not significant and 
therefore we are not able to interpret the effect the crises had on banks’ leverage.   
5. Conclusion 
We have analyzed multinational banks’ response to taxation. For the empirical 
analysis we have employed the international bank dataset Bankscope. First, we 
find that reported earnings of multinational banks’ subsidiaries significantly 
respond to host country tax incentives. The magnitude of the tax sensitivity of 
reported profits is significantly larger compared to effects found in previous 
studies for non-financial MNCs. Thus, our findings suggest that banks have 
enhanced tax planning opportunities similar to firms from the IT industry or the 
retailing sector. With regard to anti-tax avoidance legislations, our findings 
suggest that strict enforcement of transfer-pricing rules is associated with less 
profit-shifting activities. 
In additional analyses, we have analyzed whether the tax response differs across 
different business models in the banking sector. We find that the tax elasticity of 
revenues generated by interest-bearing activities is less tax responsive compared to 
other activities. In particular trading gains are highly tax sensitive. Moreover, we 
have considered potential shifting channels. First, we follow up on evidence in 
accounting literature and consider loan loss provisioning. Our results suggest that 
discretionary accrual of loan loss provisions is, in fact, driven by tax incentives. 
Second, we have analyzed the tax influence on banks’ capital structure choices. 
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Our results confirm a significant positive effect of host country taxes on debt 
financing of bank subsidiaries. Yet, our results suggest that the magnitude of the 
tax response via capital structures is significantly smaller in the banking sector 
compared to previous findings for non-financial MNCs. This finding supports the 
view that bank regulation in terms of capital requirements is associated with less 
tax planning flexibility. We also find that bank regulation tends to limit tax 
planning via loan loss provisions.  
Generally, our results suggest a smaller tax responsiveness of reported profits in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008. In particular, our results suggest that 
the financial crisis seems to diminish incentives to use debt financing and 
provision making as a means to allocate taxable profits.  
Our results provide insights in the status quo of bank taxation. Interestingly, we 
find that the general tax response of reported profitability seems to be more 
pronounced than found for MNCs from other industries. It seems to be a 
challenging task for future research to provide more evidence whether only the 
location of reported profits or also the location of certain bank activities is affected 
by taxation.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 3.7: Robustness of statutory tax rates - Banks’ Profit Shifting  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
STRFIN -2.239*** -1.967*** -2.828*** -2.594*** -1.893*** -2.970*** -2.290*** -2.348*** 
 (0.218) (0.210) (0.246) (0.213) (0.213) (0.234) (0.217) (0.219) 
TA(ln) 0.679*** 0.782*** 0.678*** 0.679*** 0.693*** 0.692*** 0.680*** 0.681*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) 
EA 0.330** 0.401*** 0.383*** 0.371** 0.406*** 0.240 0.349** 0.308** 
 (0.144) (0.132) (0.144) (0.145) (0.142) (0.173) (0.144) (0.143) 
OBS (ln) 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
PAYROLL (ln) 0.253*** 0.191*** 0.254*** 0.254*** 0.216*** 0.225*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) 
GROWTH -0.845*** -0.385 -0.843*** -0.829*** -1.004*** -1.119*** -0.836*** -0.895*** 
 (0.262) (0.268) (0.262) (0.261) (0.255) (0.283) (0.261) (0.260) 
COLLATERAL 0.440*** 0.193*** 0.441*** 0.442*** 0.407*** 0.218** 0.435*** 0.444*** 
 (0.083) (0.074) (0.083) (0.083) (0.081) (0.098) (0.083) (0.083) 
INF (ln) 0.093*** 0.075*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.036* 0.062** 0.093*** 0.098*** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) 
LEVERAGE  -3.514***       
  (0.145)       
WATR   2.447***      
   (0.822)      
MINSTR    1.378***     
    (0.496)     
RULEOFLAW     -0.271***    
     (0.030)    
TP      -0.740***   
      (0.194)   
TP x STR      3.782***   
      (0.658)   
CAP       -0.172  
        (0.128)  
CAP x STR       0.357  
       (0.420)  
CRISIS x STR        0.823** 
        (0.335) 
R2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
N 18,929 18,929 18,929 18,929 18,929 15,270 18,929 18,929 
Notes: The dependent variable is earnings before taxes EBT (ln). Explanatory variables: STRFIN is the statutory corporate tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country. For countries with a federal structure STR 
equals the STR of the respective financial center. TA (ln) are total assets and OBS (ln) measures off-balance sheet items. EA are earning assets over total assets. PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel expense. 
GROWTH is the change of total assets. COLLATERAL is a tangibility measure following Gropp and Heider (2010) including total securities, treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, cash and due from banks, 
land and buildings and other tangible assets divided by the book value of assets to allow for banks’ specific asset structure. WATR is the worldwide average tax rate within the group. Inflation as the annual 
percentage in Consumer Price index of the subsidiary’s host country as reported by the World Bank Database. LEVERAGE is the total debt-to-total assets ratio. RULEOFLAW is an indicator for the host 
country’s level of rule of law, scores are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators dataset. TP is a dummy variable for the strictness of transfer pricing regulation. CAP is a dummy variable for 
banks’ limited capitalization. CRISIS is an indicator for years before and after the financial crisis. Year dummies, bank-type effects and parent-firm effects are included but not reported. Robust standard 
errors, clustered on a country-year level, are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
92 
 
TABLE 3.8: Robustness of statutory tax rates - Income from Different Business 
Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Net interest 
revenue 
Non-interest 
operating 
income 
Trading 
gains 
Net fees and 
commissions 
STRFIN -0.459*** -0.826*** -3.332*** -0.739*** 
 (0.128) (0.169) (0.448) (0.172) 
TA (ln) 0.631*** 0.260*** 0.597*** 0.175*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.050) (0.019) 
EA 0.404*** -0.606*** 0.002 -0.282*** 
 (0.105) (0.100) (0.325) (0.106) 
OBS (ln) 0.004 0.023*** -0.027 0.036*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.023) (0.008) 
PAYROLL (ln) 0.366*** 0.709*** 0.376*** 0.751*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.049) (0.017) 
GROWTH -1.068*** -0.508*** 0.069 -0.194 
 (0.169) (0.162) (0.632) (0.177) 
COLLATERAL 0.048 -0.068 1.026*** -0.454*** 
 (0.055) (0.062) (0.218) (0.052) 
INF (ln) 0.102*** 0.030 0.150*** -0.017 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.044) (0.014) 
R
2
 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.97 
N 20,944 20,355 5,907 18,929 
Notes: Dependent variables: (1) Net interest revenue (ln); (2) Non-interest operating income (ln); (3) Trading 
gains (ln); (4) Net fees and commissions (ln).  Explanatory variables: STRFIN is the statutory corporate tax 
rate of the subsidiary’s host country. For countries with a federal structure STR equals the STR of the 
respective financial center. TA is total assets TA and OBS (ln) measures off-balance sheet items. EA are 
earning assets over total assets. PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel expense. PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel 
expense. GROWTH is the change of total assets. COLLATERAL is a tangibility measure following Gropp 
and Heider (2010) including total securities, treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, cash and due from banks, 
land and buildings and other tangible assets divided by the book value of assets to allow for banks’ specific 
asset structure. INF is inflation as the annual percentage in Consumer Price index of the subsidiary’s host 
country as reported by the World Bank Database. Year dummies, bank type effects and parent-firm effects are 
included but not reported. Robust standard errors, clustered on a country-year level, are shown in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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TABLE 3.9: Robustness of statutory tax rates - Loan Loss Provisions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
STRFIN 2.169*** 2.622*** 2.697*** 2.924*** 
 (0.383) (0.386) (0.376) (0.370) 
TA (ln) 0.496*** 0.286*** 0.289*** 0.279*** 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
EA -0.667*** -0.732*** -0.757*** -0.696*** 
 (0.204) (0.214) (0.215) (0.214) 
OBS (ln) 0.007 -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
PAYROLL (ln) 0.444*** 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.332*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
GROWTH -2.752*** -2.293*** -2.293*** -2.092*** 
 (0.445) (0.462) (0.463) (0.455) 
COLLATERAL -0.766*** -0.831*** -0.831*** -0.841*** 
 (0.115) (0.117) (0.118) (0.117) 
INF (ln) 0.144*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.083*** 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
PIOP (ln)  0.351*** 0.351*** 0.352*** 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
CAP   0.657***  
    (0.175)  
CAP x STR   -2.085***  
   (0.568)  
CRISIS    0.498*** 
     (0.189) 
CRISIS x STR    -1.778*** 
    (0.573) 
R
2
 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 
N 16,208 15,592 15,592 15,592 
Notes: Dependent variable is loan loss provisions LLP (ln). Explanatory variables: STRFIN is the statutory 
corporate tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country. For countries with a federal structure STR equals the STR 
of the respective financial center.  TA (ln) are total assets and OBS (ln) measures off-balance sheet items. EA 
are earning assets over total assets. PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel expense. PAYROLL (ln) is total 
personnel expense. GROWTH is the change of total assets. COLLATERAL is a tangibility measure following 
Gropp and Heider (2010) including total securities, treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, cash and due from 
banks, land and buildings and other tangible assets divided by the book value of assets to allow for banks’ 
specific asset structure. INF is inflation as the annual percentage in Consumer Price index of the subsidiary’s 
host country as reported by the World Bank Database. PIOP (ln) is pre-impairment operating profit. CAP is a 
dummy variable for banks’ limited capitalization. CRISIS is an indicator for years before and after the 
financial crisis. Year dummies, bank-type effects and parent-firm effects are included but not reported. Robust 
standard errors, clustered on a country-year level, are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
TABLE 3.10: Robustness of statutory tax rates - Taxes and Bank Capital Structure  
 (1) (2) (3) 
STRFIN 0.065*** 0.076*** 0.070*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
TA(ln) 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EA 0.058*** 0.054*** 0.058*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
OBS (ln) -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ADJROA -0.069* -0.065* -0.068* 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
GROWTH 0.088 0.088 0.089 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
COLLATERAL -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.088*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
INF (ln) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CAP  0.032***  
  (0.009)  
CAP x STR  -0.038  
  (0.026)  
CRISIS x STR   -0.028 
   (0.021) 
R
2
 0.71 0.71 0.71 
N 22,273 22,273 22,273 
Notes: Dependent variable is the total debt-to-total asset ratio. Explanatory variables: STRFIN is the statutory 
corporate tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country. For countries with a federal structure STR equals the STR 
of the respective financial center. TA (ln) are total assets and OBS (ln) measures off-balance sheet items. EA 
are earning assets over total assets. PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel expense.. ADJROA is a profitability 
measure captured by net income and interest expenses over total assets. GROWTH is the change of total 
assets. COLLATERAL is a tangibility measure following Gropp and Heider (2010) including total securities, 
treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, cash and due from banks, land and buildings and other tangible assets 
divided by the book value of assets to allow for banks’ specific asset structure. INF is inflation as the annual 
percentage in Consumer Price index of the subsidiary’s host country as reported by the World Bank Database. 
CAP is a dummy variable for banks’ limited capitalization. CRISIS is an indicator for years before and after 
the financial crisis. Year dummies, bank type effects and parent-firm effects are included but not reported. 
Robust standard errors, clustered on a country-year level, are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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TABLE 3.11: Loan Loss Provisions – assumed nontaxation in the US 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
STR 2.178*** 2.532*** 2.553*** 2.736*** 
 (0.351) (0.358) (0.354) (0.367) 
TA (ln) 0.491*** 0.283*** 0.286*** 0.278*** 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) 
EA -0.728*** -0.806*** -0.826*** -0.782*** 
 (0.208) (0.218) (0.218) (0.219) 
OBS (ln) 0.010 -0.000 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
PAYROLL (ln) 0.437*** 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.326*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
GROWTH -2.799*** -2.365*** -2.371*** -2.206*** 
 (0.446) (0.464) (0.465) (0.465) 
COLLATERAL -0.744*** -0.802*** -0.803*** -0.809*** 
 (0.118) (0.119) (0.120) (0.119) 
INF (ln) 0.137*** 0.091*** 0.089*** 0.078*** 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
PIOP (ln)  0.345*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
CAP   0.546***  
    (0.169)  
CAP x STR   -1.751***  
   (0.554)  
CRISIS x STR    -1.513** 
    (0.683) 
R
2
 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 
N 16,208 15,592 15,592 15,592 
Notes: Dependent variable is loan loss provisions LLP (ln). Explanatory variables: STR is the statutory 
corporate tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country, here the US statutory corporate tax rate equals zero. TA 
(ln) are total assets and OBS (ln) measures off-balance sheet items. EA are earning assets over total assets. 
PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel expense. PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel expense. GROWTH is the 
change of total assets. COLLATERAL is a tangibility measure following Gropp and Heider (2010) including 
total securities, treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, cash and due from banks, land and buildings and other 
tangible assets divided by the book value of assets to allow for banks’ specific asset structure. INF is inflation 
as the annual percentage in Consumer Price index of the subsidiary’s host country as reported by the World 
Bank Database. PIOP (ln) is pre-impairment operating profit. CAP is a dummy variable for banks’ limited 
capitalization. CRISIS is an indicator for years before and after the financial crisis. Year dummies, bank-type 
effects and parent-firm effects are included but not reported. Robust standard errors, clustered on a country-
year level, are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 3.12: Loan Loss Provisions – Sample excluding US banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
STR 2.086*** 2.585*** 2.676*** 3.091*** 
 (0.414) (0.413) (0.412) (0.382) 
TA (ln) 0.468*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.262*** 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
EA -0.678*** -0.770*** -0.801*** -0.693*** 
 (0.212) (0.220) (0.222) (0.217) 
OBS (ln) 0.015 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
PAYROLL (ln) 0.461*** 0.332*** 0.333*** 0.338*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
GROWTH -2.808*** -2.262*** -2.262*** -1.930*** 
 (0.483) (0.475) (0.475) (0.455) 
COLLATERAL -0.747*** -0.776*** -0.771*** -0.794*** 
 (0.121) (0.124) (0.123) (0.124) 
INF (ln) 0.148*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.081*** 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
PIOP (ln)  0.354*** 0.355*** 0.355*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
CAP   0.402**  
    (0.164)  
CAP x STR   -1.171**  
   (0.522)  
CRISIS x STR    -2.795*** 
    (0.474) 
R
2
 -2.985*** -2.355*** -2.348*** -2.517*** 
N (0.376) (0.389) (0.389) (0.386) 
Notes: Dependent variable is loan loss provisions LLP (ln). Explanatory variables: STR is the statutory 
corporate tax rate of the subsidiary’s host country. TA (ln) are total assets and OBS (ln) measures off-balance 
sheet items. EA are earning assets over total assets. PAYROLL (ln) is total personnel expense. PAYROLL 
(ln) is total personnel expense. GROWTH is the change of total assets. COLLATERAL is a tangibility 
measure following Gropp and Heider (2010) including total securities, treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, 
cash and due from banks, land and buildings and other tangible assets divided by the book value of assets to 
allow for banks’ specific asset structure. INF is inflation as the annual percentage in Consumer Price index of 
the subsidiary’s host country as reported by the World Bank Database. PIOP (ln) is pre-impairment operating 
profit. CAP is a dummy variable for banks’ limited capitalization. CRISIS is an indicator for years before and 
after the financial crisis. Year dummies, bank-type effects and parent-firm effects are included but not 
reported. Robust standard errors, clustered on a country-year level, are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
“Although participation in the program was not necessary from a capital 
adequacy perspective, as our capital position was strong, it was determined to be 
financially beneficial and provided U.S. Bancorp with the ongoing capacity for 
additional loan growth and for funding growth initiatives.” 
U.S. Bancorp Annual Report, 2008 
The financial crisis in 2008/2009 caused intensive liquidity issues for banks in 
various countries. Fearing an even more severe effect on the overall economy, 
many governments bailed out banks to stabilize the financial sector. As there was 
no coordinated approach, the design of these rescue packages varied among 
countries.
32
 Nevertheless, a rough classification can be made between guarantees 
and capital injections. Guarantees on bank credits were given by several 
governments in an attempt to calm down markets and increase vanishing liquidity. 
However in some cases, this was not enough to save institutions from bankruptcy. 
Therefore, as an additional instrument capital was given to institutions in financial 
disrupt.  
With this being the most extensive and costly form of support and also attracting 
attention from tax payers, a broad discussion on banks’ responsibility for the crisis 
and the necessity of government rescue packages followed. Public opinion was 
highly critical suspecting moral hazard among banks being one major trigger. 
Being considered as too big to fail for a long time, financial institutions were able 
to profit from a lower risk premium due to assumed government support in case of 
                                                          
32
 A valuable overview is given by Panetta et al. (2009). 
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bankruptcy.
33
 This is suspected to lead banks to engage in high risk transactions to 
maximize their profits while shifting costs of default towards the tax payer. 
However, one could also argue that banks do contribute substantially to tax 
revenue and countries’ welfare and therefore deserve to be rescued. Whereas there 
seems to be some agreement on the necessity of bailouts since the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008, the discussion on lessons to be learned from the crisis 
has targeted various topics.  
In this context public debate has focused mainly on (recapitalized) banks’ business 
models and compensation plans; however, banks’ role as tax payers was widely 
ignored. This is surprising, since one major aspect of the discussion was how the 
crisis related costs could be shifted towards the financial sector. Existing empirical 
studies have already investigated recapitalized banks concerning bank lending 
(Mariathasan and Merrouche 2012; Brei et al. 2013) and risk taking behavior (Brei 
and Gadanecz 2012). However, although there is some evidence of banks’ tax 
aggressiveness in general (Keen and de Mooij 2012; Heckemeyer and de Mooij, 
2014; Huizinga et al. 2014), there is so far no research on the link between 
recapitalized banks and their tax strategy. For this purpose, the recent financial 
crisis gives us optimal conditions to evaluate a change in tax aggressiveness of 
troubled banks before and after the crisis. 
In contrast to other rescue packages (e.g. guarantees) capital injections give 
governments shareholder power. Previous literature shows an impact of 
government ownership on corporations’ behavior. Iannotta et al. (2013) find that 
                                                          
33
 O’Hara and Shaw (1990) provide an early study of this effect, more recent Acharya, Anginer, 
and Warburton (2013). 
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government-owned banks have a different risk taking behavior than private banks. 
Other studies report a change in tax aggressiveness due to ownership structure and 
corporate governance influence (Desai et al. 2007; Desai and Dharmapala 2008; 
Chen et al. 2010; Chyz et al. 2013). We want to contribute to this discussion by 
investigating the influence of government support on banks’ tax planning 
behavior. Results of our study can give us some insight into whether capital 
injections should be tied to additional conditions in the future.  
In our empirical analysis we use consolidated balance sheet and income statement 
information from the Bankscope Database provided by Bureau van Dijk for 856 
multinational banks headquartered in 10 OECD countries. We manually identify 
93 banks that received government support during the financial crisis. Our study 
applies propensity score matching in a difference-in-differences framework (DID-
PSM approach) and contributes to recent studies applying propensity score 
matching in the context of taxation (Wamser 2008; Finke 2014). 
 We investigate the influence of the recapitalization by comparing the change in 
tax aggressiveness, as measured by the effective tax rate (ETR), of rescued banks 
between 2007 and 2011 to the counterfactual trend of a control group which 
consists of non-rescued banks. Our results provide evidence that the 
recapitalizations caused a significant change in tax aggressiveness for rescued 
banks. Recapitalized banks had significantly lower ETRs measured one year 
before the financial crisis. However, the ETRs of the rescued and non-rescued 
banks converge after the financial crisis. We associate the change in tax 
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aggressiveness with an increased shareholder power and influence of the 
government associated with capital injections.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a discussion of 
the relationship between international tax planning of banks and recapitalization 
measures in previous literature is provided. Section 3 shows an overview of our 
dataset. Section 4 describes the methodology, i.e. the matching procedure. Here, 
we also assess the matching quality which is a prerequisite for drawing valid 
conclusions. Empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Recapitalization and International Tax Planning of Banks 
The aim of this study is to link banks’ tax aggressiveness with capital injections 
during the financial crisis. We want to investigate if receiving government support 
did have any impact on banks’ tax planning activities.  
As a reaction to the events of the financial crisis many banks announced plans to 
change their corporate culture. Some of these changes were not merely voluntary, 
but a reaction to conditions tied to the respective support measure. Most rescue 
packages entailed specific conditions targeting remuneration and lending policy. 
To enforce these conditions governments implemented additional monitoring 
options. As an example, the U.S. Treasury demanded to send an observer if certain 
conditions were not met.
34
 However, none of the recapitalization schemes we 
analyze had any specific tax conditions attached to receiving capital.   
                                                          
34
 Members of the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) agreed to allow a government appointed 
observer in their board meetings in case of repayment delays. 
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We want to emphasize the importance of this point for two reasons. First, most 
headquarters of multinational banks are located in rather high-tax jurisdictions 
such as the U.S. and the U.K.; therefore, aggressive tax planning equals a 
reduction in tax revenue in these countries.
35
 In contrast, the majority of rescue 
packages were issued to the respective headquarters of multinational banks – in 
high tax jurisdictions. Thus, while tax revenue is shifted to favorable destinations, 
government support is received from generous governments at home. Second, a 
meaningful ex-post contribution of banks to the crisis related costs can most likely 
be collected in form of taxes. Therefore, banks’ tax aggressiveness after the crisis 
should be evaluated. Although previous literature has already investigated banks’ 
tax aggressiveness in general (Keen and de Mooij 2012; Heckemeyer and de 
Mooij 2014; Huizinga et al. 2014), there is so far no research on the impact of 
recapitalization on tax planning strategies.  
Governments can be considered the largest minority shareholder in almost all 
corporations due to its tax claim on cash flows (Desai et al. 2007). Capital 
injections can be assumed to increase governments’ influence and supervision as 
shareholders. Since governments are receivers of tax payments, we expect them to 
try to limit tax planning of the respective bank. This assumption is supported by 
evidence on government ownership. Several studies report a change in bank risk 
(Iannotta et al. 2013) and in tax aggressiveness (Desai et al. 2007; Desai and 
Dharmapala 2008; Chen et al. 2010; Chyz et al. 2013) due to ownership structure 
and corporate governance influence. In addition, it can be assumed that banks 
                                                          
35
 The average statutory tax rate in our sample is 27.94 %. 
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profiting from government support were eager to reinstate their reputation; and, in 
response to public attention, reduced their tax planning.  
However, it is also imaginable that banks do not show any loyalty and continue to 
engage in aggressive tax planning activities. This would show in smaller or at least 
unchanged effective tax rates (ETRs). A potential reason could be that 
governments’ possibilities to monitor banks’ behavior were limited and not 
sufficient to influence banks’ tax planning. Studies using a similar data set found 
no evidence for a change in risk taking (Brei and Gadanecz 2012). Aggressive tax 
planning strategy goes along with increased risk of future payments caused by tax 
audit detections. Banks staying risk prone in general might also continue their tax 
planning strategy. In consequence, it might be that tax aggressiveness did at last 
not decrease.  
We contribute to a number of studies investigating the effects of rescue packages 
on banks’ behavior. Panetta et al. (2009) give a valuable overview of 
governments’ rescue measures between 2008 and 2009. Brei et al. (2013) and 
Mariathasan and Merrouche (2012) document determinants of recapitalization and 
examine the effect rescue measures had on the supply of bank lending. They find 
similar results suggesting that only capital injections of a certain amount can be 
associated with loan growth. Focusing on market reactions to government 
measures, King (2009) finds that creditors benefited from rescue packages at the 
expense of shareholders. To the best of our knowledge, there is so far no research 
on the taxation and tax planning activities of recapitalized banks. As a measure of 
tax aggressiveness, we use the ETR disclosed in consolidated financial statements 
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according to SFAS 109 or IAS 12 (depending on the accounting standard) which is 
defined as the sum of current and deferred taxes divided by profit before tax. This 
commonly used proxy for tax avoidance is widely available to investors and to the 
public. It is a well-accepted measure for tax behavior in previous literature 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  
3. Data 
Key asset for the following analysis is the identification of recapitalization 
measures on individual bank level. This data was hand-collected for large 
multinational banks headquartered in 10 OECD countries for which public rescue 
information were available. Our control group consists of all other banks in the 
respective country. As there is no comprehensible list of capital injections in 
general, we have to rely on intensive research. In order to identify rescued banks, 
we use public sources (e.g. news reports, official websites of national authorities) 
and confirm our findings through banks’ annual reports. 
In total, we have collected information on 93 banks that received government 
support in form of capital in 2008 and/or 2009. By hand-collecting this unique 
dataset we are able to differentiate between rescued and non-rescued banks for all 
major countries affected by the financial crisis. To be considered recapitalized in 
our sample, a bank must have received capital injections from a public fund. There 
have been additional measures, such as guarantees, nevertheless for our study we 
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focus only on capital injections.
36
 We do not include banks receiving guarantee 
measures in our analysis for two reasons. First, our research question assumes an 
increasing influence of governments on banks’ business decisions. Although there 
was a variety of measures valuable to banks, we believe that only an increasing 
shareholder power would give governments sufficient information and possibilities 
to influence banks’ tax avoidance strategies. Second, guarantee measures were 
often provided to the whole banking sector and therefore would have limited our 
control group of non-treated banks substantially.  
Our group of banks which did not receive government support consists of 763 
banks. Table 4.1 provides a detailed overview of the 10 countries in which the 
rescued and non-rescued banks are located.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                          
36
 Capital injections came in the following forms: Common equity, Preference capital, Hybrid 
capital, Subordinated notes, Contribution to reserves, Conversion of subordinated debt into equity 
capital. 
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TABLE 4.1: Country Overview 
Country Recap = 1 Recap = 0 Total 
Germany 6 81 87 
France 6 148 154 
The Netherlands 3 46 49 
U.K. 5 150 155 
Ireland 2 23 25 
Belgium 3 27 30 
Luxembourg 1 19 20 
Austria 3 46 49 
Switzerland 1 73 74 
U.S. 63 150 213 
TOTAL 93 763 856 
Note: Table 4.1 shows an overview where the rescued and non-rescued banks are located in our sample. 
 
For all 856 banks we collect balance sheet and income statement information from 
the Bankscope Database provided by Bureau van Dijk for the years 2007 and 
2011.
37
 We rely on consolidated statements, since they provide relevant 
information on the internationally active banking groups’ tax burden. Moreover, 
public capital injections were typically given to consolidated entities, rather than 
subsidiaries or branches.  
We conduct several dataset adjustments. To obtain a sufficiently balanced sample, 
we restrict attention to the 150 largest banks in the U.S. and U.K.
38
 Moreover, 
                                                          
37 
For our robustness check we also collect data for the year 2010 [cf. Section 5.2].  
38
 In the U.S. more than 700 banks profited from CPP. Since data on smaller banks is limited we 
restrict our control group to the 150 largest banks, measured by total assets, to avoid a mix-up of 
both groups. The same was done for the UK. 
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recapitalizations are only considered if provided in 2008 and/or 2009. This is 
necessary to define a clear treatment window which enables us to analyze before 
and after treatment effects.
39
 Acquisitions in general pose no risk to our analysis, 
since tax aggressiveness is expected to be extended to a newly acquired entity. 
However, we eliminated banks from our sample which were either nationalized, 
went bankrupt or merged to a new entity during the crisis. In addition, we 
eliminate loss banks as they have different tax planning strategies. ETRs
40
 with a 
negative component have a different interpretation and are therefore eliminated 
accordingly (cf. Stickney and McGee 1982; Zimmermann 1983; Gupta and 
Newberry 1997; Rego 2003). 
4. Methodology  
4.1 Difference-in-Differences Propensity Score Matching Approach 
The optimal setting to investigate the effect of the governmental recapitalizations 
on banks’ tax aggressiveness would require observing each bank in both states 
(with and without treatment) in each period. However, as it is not possible to 
observe how the bank would have performed without receiving the treatment, the 
best alternative is to build an adequate control group that is similar to the treated 
group with respect to as many criteria as possible.  
Therefore, we identify banks which received recapitalization (RECAP=1) as our 
treatment group and assign banks which are not subject to treatment (RECAP=0) 
                                                          
39
 Rescue packages in Spain, for example, were still ongoing in 2012. Therefore, Spain is not 
included in our sample. In the case of Japan, the major earthquake of 2011 distorts results and led 
us to exclude Japanese banks. 
40
 To limit the influence of outliers, we winsorize the ETRs at the interval [0; 1]. 
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to our control group. We use propensity score matching which is a popular method 
to estimate causal effects and obtain a control group as similar to our treatment 
group as possible. This involves a two-step procedure: In the first step, we predict 
the probability of being treated by government support (propensity score) using a 
probit regression with respect to a vector of relevant pre-treatment observables Xi 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In our binary model the choice of the underlying 
model is relatively unproblematic (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008): 
  p(Xi) = Pr (RECAPi=1| Xi) = ϕ (β0 + β1Xi)                                (1) 
In the second step, we match each treated bank (RECAP=1) to one or more non-
treated banks (RECAP=0), being sufficiently similar with respect to the 
observables Xi. The matching procedure is based on the propensity score from the 
first step. In our study, we use different matching algorithms to match the treated 
and the non-treated group in order to avoid bias due to the chosen matching 
method [cf. Section 4.3 and Section 5].  
Applying propensity score matching requires two assumptions to be fulfilled. First, 
for the probit regression the propensity score as a probability has to lie between 
zero and one for both groups, i.e. banks with the same value of observables Xi 
have the identical positive probability of being both treated and non-treated 
(Heckman et al., 1999). This Common Support Condition ensures that only banks 
with suitable control units are considered: 
          0 < Pr (RECAPi =1| Xi) <1                                       (2) 
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As the aim of applying propensity score matching is to avoid bias due to selection 
observables, the second main prerequisite for the application of propensity score 
matching is the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). The CIA requires 
that the selection into the group of recapitalized (RECAP=1) or non-recapitalized 
(RECAP=0) is only driven by observables (a vector of characteristics Xi). This is 
to say that there exists a set Xi of observables such that after controlling for these 
characteristics, potential outcomes, in our case ETRs, are independent of treatment 
status i.e. recap status. It can then be assumed that this condition is exogenous: 
(ETRi(1), ETRi(0)) ⊥ RECAPi| Xi                               (3) 
Having obtained two groups only differing in their treatment status, we are able to 
compare banks’ tax aggressiveness. In order to capture a bank’s tax avoidance 
behavior we use ETRs as reported in the financial statements as outcome variable. 
A change in the outcome variable due to the treatment is usually called ATT 
(Average Treatment Effect on the Treated). Theoretically, this effect is the 
difference Δi between the tax aggressiveness ETRi(1) of a bank i which received 
government support and the tax aggressiveness of the same bank i in the 
hypothetical case of not receiving government support ETRi(0): 
   Δi = ETRi(1) - ETRi(0)                                           (4) 
  ATT = E(ETRi(1) - ETRi(0) | RECAP=1)                           (5) 
However, this effect does not control for the counterfactual trend of both groups. 
Our study therefore applies a difference-in-differences framework (Heckman et 
al., 1998). According to the difference-in-differences method the effect of a 
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recapitalization treatment is identified by comparing the change in tax 
aggressiveness of the treatment group between two periods (here 2007 and 2011) 
to the counterfactual trend in tax aggressiveness they would have experienced in 
the absence of the treatment. The counterfactual trend is approximated by the 
actual change in tax aggressiveness of the control group between 2007 and 2011.  
By forming “statistical twin pairs” before performing the DID estimator, 
propensity score matching makes the standard difference-in-differences 
assumption more plausible as the between-comparison removes common period 
effects that identically affect the treatment and control group. The plausibility of 
this common trend assumption is based on the similarity in propensity scores of 
treated and control group. Compared to the alternative of controlling linearly for 
the Xi observable variables in a DID regression, the DID-PSM approach has two 
advantages. It guarantees a more appropriate weighting of covariates and does not 
extrapolate beyond the region of common support avoiding comparison of non-
comparable units.  
4.2 Selection of Relevant Characteristics 
A central issue for propensity score matching is the choice of observable variables 
driving the self-selection process and thus being relevant for computing the 
propensity score. Only variables that influence both the treatment decision and the 
outcome variable should be included.
41
 In addition, only variables that are 
                                                          
41
 Explanatory variables can be divided into three sets: (1) Covariates which strongly influence the 
treatment decision but weakly the outcome variable, (2) Covariates which are relevant to the 
outcome variable but irrelevant to the treatment decision and (3) Covariates which influence both. 
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unaffected by the treatment (or the anticipation of it) should be considered to avoid 
endogeneity problems. Therefore, we use the 2007 values of the covariates, i.e. the 
values before the financial crisis and government support for our matching 
procedure (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).  
In the propensity score matching we take into account banks’ characteristics that 
are expected to differ across the respective treatment and control groups. The DID-
PSM approach allows us to balance the treatment and control group with respect to 
these characteristics making the common trend assumption more plausible. For 
this purpose, we follow Mariathasan and Merrouche (2012) and Brei et al. (2013) 
who investigate differences between rescued and non-rescued banks with a sample 
similar to ours. We can therefore rely on these results when determining relevant 
characteristics of recapitalized banks that can affect treatment assignment.  
We choose the variable SIZE which is the sum of total assets and off-balance sheet 
items (in logs) as it is a potentially important factor in lending decisions. During 
the crisis, large banks were particularly affected by their lower deposit funding 
ratio. According to Brei et al. (2013) recapitalized banks were on average twice 
the size compared to non-rescued banks. Therefore, we can expect a positive 
relationship between recapitalization status and bank size. We also add the 
variable ROA which is measured by adjusting net income with interest expenses 
divided by total assets as a proxy for profitability. High profits could lead banks to 
retain earnings and lower the leverage ratio. As a higher equity ratio could reduce 
the demand for external lending, we expect a negative correlation. In addition, we 
                                                                                                                                                                
The propensity score estimation should at least include set (3) (Augurzky and Schmidt 2001; 
Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). 
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consider the variable LEVERAGE which is the quotient between total liabilities 
and total assets as the leverage ratio should have a positive influence on the 
recapitalization of a bank. LIQUIDITY which is defined as liquid assets (including 
cash, trading securities and interbank lending with a maturity of less than three 
months) divided by total assets is also an important characteristic of rescued banks 
as their reliance on market funding before and during the crisis was generally 
higher (Brei et al. 2013). Liquidity should have a negative impact on the 
recapitalization status of a bank. Moreover, we add the variable COLLATERAL 
which is a tangibility measure including total securities, treasury bills, other bills, 
bonds, CDs, cash and due from banks, land and buildings and other tangible assets 
divided by the book value of assets (Gropp and Heider 2010) in order to capture 
for banks’ specific asset structure. As a high level of tangibility makes external 
lending more attractive (easier access and lower costs), we expect a positive 
correlation with a bank’s recapitalization status, since lending conditions changed 
dramatically during the financial crisis. Finally, we take the variable LLP into 
consideration, which captures a bank’s accrual of loan loss provisions (in logs). 
Since banks with a high level of LLPs can be assumed to have a higher amount of 
defaulting credits, we expect a positive correlation with recapitalization status. 
The computation of the propensity score should also include determinants of the 
outcome variable ETR in addition to the drivers of the selection decision 
(Heckmann et al. 1998). In our study, there is some overlap of both groups of 
determinants. For example, prior studies find a significant influence of size and 
profitability (Zimmermann 1983; Gupta and Newberry 1997; Plesko 2003; Rego 
2003; Chen et al. 2010) on tax planning activities. In addition, leverage is 
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associated with tax aggressiveness. Banks with a high level of debt can use the 
deductibility of interest expenses to reduce tax burden. However, the effect of 
leverage on the ETR is ambiguous since interest payments do not only reduce 
taxable profits, and thus, tax expenditures, but also pre-tax earnings (Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010). Loan loss provisions’ tax deductibility varies by country, 
however the accrual of bad loans in high tax countries can be seen as a proxy for 
future deductions in case of credit default and therefore as a tax planning tool. 
Table 4.2 shows the means of the observable characteristics before matching. The 
comparison shows with the exception of ROA and COLLATERAL, both groups of 
banks are significantly different. These results show the necessity to establish an 
adequate control group via propensity score matching. 
TABLE 4.2: Means of the selected observable characteristics before matching 
Characteristics Recap = 1 Recap = 0 t-stat p-value 
SIZE 11.4112 9.1208 -9.1402 0.0000 
ROA 0.0420 0.0804 0.5459 0.5853 
LEVERAGE 0.9194 0.8673 -2.9189 0.0036 
LIQUIDITY 0.1433 0.2435 3.7466 0.0002 
COLLATERAL 0.2890 0.2701 -0.7474 0.4550 
LLP 4.8272 3.2204 -6.4369 0.0000 
Notes: Table 4.2 compares the mean of selected characteristics between rescued banks (Recap = 1) and non-
rescued banks (Recap = 0) before matching in 2007. Except of ROE and COLLATERAL, the differences 
between both groups are highly significant.   
 
4.3 Estimating the Propensity Score 
We use the observable characteristics which we derive in Section 4.2 to calculate 
the probability of receiving government support (propensity score). In accordance 
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with Heckman et al. (1998), we estimate the propensity score by taking the 
determinants of a bank’s recapitalization and of the outcome, in our case tax 
aggressiveness (ETR) as explanatory variables [cf. Equation (1)]. In addition, as 
Mariathasan and Merrouche (2012) find an influence of different banks’ 
specializations, we ensure that only banks belonging to the same specialty are 
matched. 
Pr(RECAP) = β0 + β1log(SIZE) + β2ROA +  β3LEVERAGE + 
β4LIQUIDITY + β5COLLATERAL +   β6log(LLP) +  ɛ                           (6)            
             
Table 4.3 shows the coefficients of the probit regression. All determinants have the 
expected sign. The size of the coefficients cannot be directly interpreted as there 
are no marginal effects of the explaining variables on the dependent variable. 
However, this is not relevant here as the coefficients are exclusively used to 
calculate the propensity score. 
TABLE 4.3: Estimating the Propensity Score 
  Coefficient S.E. z P>|z| 
SIZE 0.2106 0.0809 2.60 0.009 
ROA -0.0530 0.6241 -0.08 0.932 
LEVERAGE 0.8909 1.6700 0.53 0.594 
LIQUIDITY -2.4570 0.6685 -3.68 0.000 
COLLATERAL 0.7076 0.5818 1.22 0.224 
LLP 0.0628 0.0616 1.02 0.308 
CONSTANT -4.1394 1.4610 -2.83 0.005 
Notes: Table 4.3 shows the coefficients of the probit regression.  
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As the propensity score is a probability of receiving treatment given observed 
characteristics Xi, it has to be in the interval [0;1] [cf. Equation (2)]. In our sample, 
the average probability to participate in the treatment for all banks is 0.14. Based 
on the propensity score, we use for the matching in our study five to one nearest 
neighbor algorithm (with replacement) which assigns five of the closest non-
treated observations to match the treated one. We choose this matching method as 
especially in small samples of treated units this method is more reliable. It reduces 
the variability of the nearest neighbor estimator in comparison to a one to one 
neighbor matching (Blundell and Costa-Dias 2008). To ensure matching quality 
we set the maximum caliper at 0.01. Due to the caliper, the propensity scores 
between treated and matched control banks do not deviate in absolute terms by 
more than 0.01.  
However, to show that the results are not driven by the applied matching 
algorithm, we also apply kernel matching and one to one nearest neighbor 
matching in Section 5. One to one nearest neighbor matching matches to each 
treated unit the control unit with the closest propensity score. Kernel matching 
uses weighted averages of all controls in order to match treated and control units. 
The shorter the distance between the treated and the control observation, the 
greater is the weight. Thus, this method can use more information as it reduces the 
variance of the estimation. 
4.4 Assessing Matching Quality 
Before we report the results with respect to our research question, we first provide 
information on the matching quality concerning the two main assumptions of 
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propensity score matching - Conditional Independence Assumption and Common 
Support Condition [cf. Section 4.1.]. The Conditional Independence Assumption 
cannot be directly tested, but several guidelines for model specification should be 
considered. Since we do not condition on all covariates but on the propensity 
score, we have to check if the matching procedure is able to adequately balance 
the distribution of these characteristics. For the validity of results it is important 
that the treated and control group are sufficiently similar after the matching. This 
prerequisite can be assessed in a balancing test by the standardized bias (SBx) for 
each variable. The SBx is calculated by dividing the difference between the mean 
characteristic of the treatment (?̅?𝑡𝑟) and matched control group (?̅?𝑐𝑜) by the square 
root of the mean variance in each group (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985) and 
expressed as a percentage: 
𝑆𝐵𝑥 = 100 ∗  
?̅?𝑡𝑟− ?̅?𝑐𝑜
√
𝜎𝑥𝑡𝑟
2 + 𝜎𝑥𝑐𝑜
2
2
 %                                         (7) 
Table 4.4 compares the means of all relevant characteristics between rescued 
banks and a control group which was determined via propensity score matching 
(five to one nearest neighbor caliper matching) before and after matching and 
displays the standardized bias for all observable variables.  
The results show that the propensity score matching succeeds at balancing the 
covariates and reducing the bias between banks with and without recapitalization. 
With the exception of ROA and LEVERAGE, all variables are significant before 
matching i.e. the unmatched treatment and control group differ substantially. After 
matching the standardized bias should be about 5 % for the key variables as this 
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indicates good matching quality. Otherwise the mean difference is considered 
quite large and may indicate a lack of balancing (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). 
The standardized biases are acceptable for all variables. By the matching, the 
differences between treatment group and non-treatment group are reduced 
considerably. An exception is the variable COLLATERAL. For this variable, the 
standardized bias is about 9 %. However, the two columns on the right hand side 
show that the difference in the variable COLLATERAL is not significant after 
matching which confirms that the variable is no longer an explanation for the 
recapitalization status of a bank.  
TABLE 4.4: Assessment of Matching Quality 
Variable 
 Mean % %   
 Treated Control Bias 
Reduction 
(Bias) 
T p>|t| 
SIZE Unmatched 11.283 9.790 77.3  6.42 0.000 
 Matched 11.050 11.059 -0.5 99.4 -0.03 0.977 
ROA Unmatched 0.408 0.094 -9.3  -0.58 0.565 
 Matched 0.040 0.037 0.6 93.5 1.67 0.096 
LEVERAGE Unmatched 0.918 0.904 20.7  1.36 0.174 
 Matched 0.914 0.917 -4.3 79.2 -0.47 0.643 
LIQUIDITY Unmatched 0.135 0.178 -25.9  -1.97 0.049 
 Matched 0.122 0.129 -4.2 83.7 -0.29 0.773 
COLLATERAL Unmatched 0.267 0.227 27.3  2.01 0.045 
 Matched 0.253 0.267 -9.4 65.5 -0.63 0.533 
LLP Unmatched 4.827 3.226 77.3  6.42 0.000 
 Matched 4.648 4.699 -2.5 96.8 -0.14 0.891 
Notes: Table 4.4 compares the means of all relevant characteristics between rescued banks and a control group 
of non-rescued banks which was determined by propensity score in 2007. The results are based on five to one 
nearest neighbor caliper matching.  
 
The bias reduction can also be illustrated graphically. Figure 4.1 compares the 
standardized bias before matching (indicated with points) to the standardized bias 
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after matching (indicated with small crosses). The figure illustrates again the 
successful reduction in standardized bias due to the matching procedure. 
FIGURE 4.1: Bias Reduction for Characteristics 
 
A further possibility to assess the quality of the matching consists in re-estimating 
the probit regression based on the matched sample. Table 4.5 illustrates again that 
the observable characteristics do not longer explain the recapitalization status of a 
bank. The explanatory power in terms of pseudo-R
2 
is reduced from 0.134 to 0.022 
and the observables are not only separately insignificant as shown in Table 4.4 but 
also jointly insignificant (𝜌 > 𝑥2  = 0.675). Moreover, the table shows that in the 
mean bias between the two groups before and after matching and across all 
characteristics is reduced from 39.6 % to 3.6 %. As the mean standardized bias 
over all variables is below 5 %, we can again confirm a good matching quality.  
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TABLE 4.5: Joint Insignificance of Observables after Matching 
  Pseudo-R² p > χ² 
            Bias 
Mean Median 
Raw 0.134 0.000 39.6 26.6 
Matched 0.022 0.675 3.6 3.4 
Notes: Table 4.5 shows that after matching observable characteristics do no longer provide joint explanatory 
power for Recap Status. The results are based on five to one nearest neighbor caliper matching. 
 
In addition, the Common Support Condition should be tested which ensures that 
there is a sufficient overlap of the propensity scores of the treated and non-treated 
group in order to find adequate matches. This can be done by visual inspection. 
Figure 4.2 shows that we can assume that the common support is given as there is 
a certain number of treated and non-treated banks between the interval [0;1] in 
each class of the propensity score. In addition, imposing the Common Support 
Condition only leads to the exclusion of a few treatment observations.  
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FIGURE 4.2: Common Support Condition 
 
Notes: The figure illustrates that the propensity score as a probability lies between zero and one for both 
groups (treated and untreated). 
 
To conclude all information on the matching quality, we can show that through the 
propensity-score five to one nearest neighbor caliper matching, it was possible to 
generate a control group which is similar enough to the treatment group to be used 
to calculate the ATT using difference-in-differences method.  
5.  Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Basic Results 
As we want to examine if the tax aggressiveness of treated banks has changed in 
the years after they received governmental support, we use a difference-in-
differences propensity score matching (DID-PSM) approach (Heckman et al. 
0 .2 .4 .6
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
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1998) to compare tax aggressiveness of recapitalized banks and banks not 
receiving government support. We take the outcome variable ETR as measure of 
banks’ tax aggressiveness in 2007 which is the year before the recapitalization 
occurs and compare it with the ETR in 2011. We choose 2011 instead of 2010 to 
allow for some time to successfully implement or change existing tax planning 
strategies after the financial crisis.
42
 Moreover, we assume that crisis related 
balance sheet distortions have faded out until then.  
In particular, we calculate not only the ATT on the outcome variable ETR in 2007 
and 2011 but also the effect on the change in the outcome variable before and after 
the treatment. As derived in Section 4.1 the difference-in-differences matching 
relies on the assumption that the change in the outcome variable ETR between 
2007 and 2011 would be the same for the treatment and the control group in the 
absence of the recapitalization. This allows us to control for the notion that there 
may be unobserved differences between treated and untreated units. Thus, an 
advantage of the combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-
differences method is not only the potential selection of observables but also the 
elimination of time constant unobservables.  
The main result of the difference-in-differences analysis is presented in the last 
column of Table 4.6 and significant at 5% level. It indicates a change in rescued 
banks’ tax aggressiveness, namely higher reported ETRs, caused by capital 
injections in 2008/09. The effect is robust concerning time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
                                                          
42
 An estimation using 2010 instead of 2011 can be found in our robustness tests. 
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The BASELINE columns contain the mean outcome for each group (control and 
treated) before recapitalization in 2007 and its difference. The mean ETR of the 
treated group is smaller (3.1 percentage points) which is an indicator for more tax 
planning activities. The difference between the means is significant at 10 % level 
and suggests that banks receiving public funds were on average more tax 
aggressive in 2007. The FOLLOW UP columns show the same information after 
the recapitalization. The results indicate that the ETRs of the treated and control 
group converge in 2011. The difference between the mean outcomes is now 
positive, but not statistically significant anymore. This supports our assumption 
that increasing influence and supervision by governments and public attention lead 
to a reduction in banks’ tax aggressiveness.  
TABLE 4.6: Difference-in-Differences Method – 5to1 NN-Matching 
 BASELINE (2007) FOLLOW UP (2011) 
Outcome 
Variable 
Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-
IN-
DIFF 
ETR 0.282 0.251 -0.031* 0.252 0.274 0.022 0.053** 
Std. E (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) 
Notes: Table 6 shows the mean outcome for the treated and control group in 2007 and 2011 and its difference. 
The outcome variable is the ETR. The results are based on five to one nearest neighbor caliper matching. 
Observations in the control group 219, observations in the treatment group 133. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at (1%), (5%) and (10%) level, respectively. 
 
To show that the results are not driven by the applied matching algorithm, we also 
test samples matched with one to one nearest neighbor and kernel matching. The 
results are shown in Table 4.7 and 4.8 and confirm the results obtained with five to 
one nearest neighbor matching. Again, we find a significant impact of the 
recapitalization status on the tax aggressiveness in 2007. The treated group has, on 
average, smaller ETRs. For the year 2011, the difference of the mean ETRs is not 
 
 
124 
 
significant. Additionally, we find again a significant effect in the difference-in-
differences approach. 
TABLE 4.7: Difference-in-Differences Method – 1to1 NN-Matching 
 BASELINE (2007) FOLLOW UP (2011) 
Outcome 
Variable 
Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-
IN-
DIFF 
ETR 0.299 0.251 -0.048* 0.252 0.274 0.022 0.070** 
Std. E (0.022) (0.013) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.035) 
Notes: Table 4.7 shows the mean outcome for the treated and control group in 2007 and 2011 and its 
difference. The outcome variable is the ETR. The results are based on one to one nearest neighbor caliper 
matching. Observations in the control group 90, observations in the treatment group 133. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at (1%), (5%) and (10%) level, 
respectively. 
 
TABLE 4.8: Difference-in-Differences Method – Kernel Matching 
 BASELINE (2007) FOLLOW UP (2011) 
Outcome 
Variable 
Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-
IN-
DIFF 
ETR 0.274 0.251 -0.023* 0.256 0.274 0.018 0.041** 
Std. E (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) 
Notes: Table 4.8 shows the mean outcome for the treated and control group in 2007 and 2011 and its 
difference. The outcome variable is the ETR. The results are based on kernel matching. Observations in the 
control group 435, observations in the treatment group 133. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
(***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at (1%), (5%) and (10%) level, respectively. 
 
5.2 Robustness Check 
In order to test robustness of our results, we carry out several additional analyses. 
We examine subsamples with respect to different regions to account for 
heterogeneity in our sample. Table 4.9 shows a difference-in-differences analysis 
when only taking recapitalized European banks into account. We obtain highly 
significant positive effects on 1 % level for the year 2007, i.e. the mean ETR of 
treated group is 9 percentage points smaller than the ETR of the respective control 
group. Again, we cannot find a significant effect of the recapitalization status on 
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the tax aggressiveness in 2011. Our results suggest that for European rescued 
banks tax aggressiveness was not only more pronounced than for non-rescued 
banks before the crisis, but that the effect is also time-constant. 
TABLE 4.9: European Sample – Difference-in-Differences Method – 5to1 NN-
Matching 
 BASELINE (2007) FOLLOW UP (2011) 
Outcome 
Variable 
Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-
IN-
DIFF 
ETR 0.282 0.192 -0.090*** 0.252 0.296 0.044 0.134** 
Std. E (0.011) (0.023) (0.025) (0.011) (0.051) (0.052) (0.058) 
Notes: Table 4.9 considers a subsample of only European banks in the treated group. It shows the mean 
outcome for the treated and control group in 2007 and 2011 and its difference. The outcome variable is the 
ETR. The results are based on five to one nearest neighbor caliper matching. Observations in the control group 
219, observations in the treatment group 40. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. (***), (**) and 
(*) indicate significance at (1%), (5%) and (10%) level, respectively. 
 
When limiting our sample to U.S. based banks only, we are not able to identify 
any effect of capital injections on tax aggressiveness. Treatment and control group 
are very similar in respect to their tax aggressiveness before and after the financial 
crisis. This can be attributed to a number of causes. First, there was no condition 
concerning taxation implemented into recapitalization contracts. Second, although 
public attention and governments’ interest in supervision in the U.S. might have 
been of equal power; the total number of more than 700 capital injections 
complicated tight supervision and lowered public attention to the single bank. 
With being one among many banks behavioral incentive might be much lower. 
Third, whereas in most European countries only few banks with a supposedly risk 
prone management style were bailed out, in the U.S. the sample includes a bigger 
variety of business models.  
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Table 4.10: U.S. Sample – Difference-in-Differences Method – 5to1 NN-Matching 
 BASELINE (2007) FOLLOW UP (2011) 
Outcome 
Variable 
Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-
IN-
DIFF 
ETR 0.260 0.283 0.022 0.269 0.267 -0.003 -0.025 
Std. E (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.027) 
Notes: Table 4.10 considers a subsample of only U.S. banks in the treated group. It shows the mean outcome 
for the treated and control group in 2007 and 2011 and its difference. The outcome variable is the ETR. The 
results are based on five to one nearest neighbor caliper matching. Observations in the control group 171, 
observations in the treatment group 93. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) 
indicate significance at (1%), (5%) and (10%) level, respectively. 
  
Choosing our event window has great impact on our analysis. Capital injection 
programs allowed banks to pay back injected capital when possible on specific 
terms. Most banks were eager to pay back governments as soon as possible. Not 
only to avoid government influence on their business decisions but also as a signal 
to their other shareholders. Therefore, one could argue that 2011 is already too late 
to measures effects of government influence. To avoid this complication we repeat 
our analysis choosing 2010 instead of 2011 as our relevant after-crisis year. As 
shown in Table 4.11 our results are robust and indicate the same behavior of tax 
aggressiveness as we measured for 2011. 
TABLE 4.11: Robustness Test Year 2010 – Difference-in-Differences Method – 5to1 
NN-Matching 
 BASELINE (2007) FOLLOW UP (2010) 
Outcome 
Variable 
Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) DIFF-
IN-
DIFF 
ETR 0.282 0.251 -0.031* 0.241 0.274 0.033 0.064* 
Std. E (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.028) (0.031) (0.036) 
Notes: Table 4.11 shows the mean outcome for the treated and control group in 2007 and 2010 and its 
difference for the entire sample. The outcome variable is the ETR. The results are based on five to one nearest 
neighbor caliper matching. Observations in the control group 222, observations in the treatment group 132.  
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at (1%), (5%) and 
(10%) level, respectively. 
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6. Conclusion 
Our study investigates tax aggressiveness of banks which received public funds 
during the recent financial crisis.  
For the empirical analysis we use a unique hand-collected data sample of 93 
multinational banks headquartered in 10 OECD countries that received support in 
form of capital from public funds in 2008 and/or 2009. Our control group, which 
did not receive government support, consists of 763 banks in the respective 
countries.  
Using propensity score matching in a difference-in-differences framework (DID-
PSM approach) we are able to compare tax aggressiveness of recapitalized banks 
with banks that did not receive support. Our main result indicates a significant 
change in tax aggressiveness caused by capital injections that is robust concerning 
time-invariant unobserved effects. 
In addition we explore the tax aggressiveness of both groups before (2007) and 
after the capital injections were received (2011). Our results show that banks 
receiving public funds in 2008 and/or 2009 had significantly lower ETRs 
measured one year before the financial crisis. However, after the recapitalization 
we cannot find significant different mean ETRs between the treated and control 
group anymore. We associate this result with increased government influence after 
strengthening its shareholder position by capital injections. 
Our findings are supported by a series of consistent robustness tests, applying a 
different event window and additional matching methods. Lastly, a closer look at 
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our sample suggests that effects differ among countries. Whereas the effect is very 
pronounced in Europe, we do not find significant results for the U.S. subsample. 
Our study contributes to the recent discussions on possible ways to regulate banks’ 
behavior. Interestingly, we find that banks did change their tax aggressiveness 
even without contractual enforcement. However, this does not hold for the U.S., 
where the majority of recapitalized banks are located. We attribute this to the 
enormous size of the recapitalization program, taking attention away from the 
single bank.  
Several policy implications can be taken from our study. First, rescue measures 
offer an opportunity to address banks’ existent tax aggressiveness. Second, 
negative behavioral patterns such as excessive risk taking and tax avoidance might 
be highly correlated. Future regulatory approaches could therefore try to address 
both issues simultaneously.   
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